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Abstract
Blind delegation protocols allow a client to delegate a computation to a server so that
the server learns nothing about the input to the computation apart from its size. For the
specific case of quantum computation we know, from work over the past decade, that blind
delegation protocols can achieve information-theoretic security (provided the client and the
server exchange some amount of quantum information). In this paper we prove, provided
certain complexity-theoretic conjectures are true, that the power of information-theoretically
secure blind delegation protocols for quantum computation (ITS-BQC protocols) is in a number
of ways constrained.
In the first part of our paper we provide some indication that ITS-BQC protocols for dele-
gating polynomial-time quantum computations in which the client and the server interact only
classically are unlikely to exist. We first show that having such a protocol in which the client
and the server exchange O(nd) bits of communication, implies that BQP ⊂ MA/O(nd). We
conjecture that this containment is unlikely by proving that there exists an oracle relative to
which BQP 6⊂ MA/O(nd). We then show that if an ITS-BQC protocol exists in which the client
and the server interact only classically and which allows the client to delegate quantum sam-
pling problems to the server (such as BosonSampling) then there exist non-uniform circuits
of size 2n−Ω(n/log(n)), making polynomially-sized queries to an NPNP oracle, for computing the
permanent of an n× n matrix.
The second part of our paper concerns ITS-BQC protocols in which the client and the server
engage in one round of quantum communication and then exchange polynomially many classical
messages. First, we provide a complexity-theoretic upper bound on the types of functions that
could be delegated in such a protocol by showing that they must be contained in QCMA/qpoly∩
coQCMA/qpoly. Then, we show that having such a protocol for delegating NP-hard functions
implies coNPNP
NP ⊆ NPNPPromiseQMA .
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1 Introduction
An important area of research in modern cryptography is that of performing computations on
encrypted data. The general idea is that a client wants to compute some function f on some input
x, but lacks the computational power to do this in a reasonable amount of time. Luckily, the
client has access to a computationally powerful server (cloud, cluster etc) which can compute f(x)
quickly. However, because the computation might involve sensitive or classified information, or
the server could be compromised remotely, we would like the input x to be hidden from the server
at all times. The client can simply encrypt x, but this raises the question: how can the server
compute f(x) if it doesn’t know x? The general problem of computing on encrypted data was
first considered by Rivest, Adleman and Dertouzos [1]. Since then, instances of this problem have
appeared in many areas of modern research including those of electronic voting, machine learning
on encrypted data, program obfuscation and others [2–7].
It was shown in 2009, when Gentry produced the first fully homomorphic encryption scheme,
that performing classical computations on encrypted data is possible [8]. In homomorphic encryp-
tion the client has a pair of efficient algorithms (Enc,Dec), which respectively perform encryption
and decryption, and which satisfy the property Dec(f, x,Eval(f,Enc(x))) = f(x), for any function
f from some set C. In other words, the server evaluates f on the encrypted input Enc(x) using
Eval and returns this to the client which can then decrypt it to f(x). Of course, the server should
not be able to infer information about x from Enc(x), a condition which is typically expressed
through the criterion of semantic security [9]. If the set C contains all polynomial-sized circuits
then the scheme becomes a fully homomorphic encryption scheme, commonly abbreviated FHE.
All known FHE schemes are secure under cryptographic assumptions.
Computing on encrypted data becomes particularly interesting when the server is a quantum
computer. This is because efficient quantum algorithms have been found for various problems
which are believed to be intractable for classical computers. In fact, it has been shown that if a
classical computer and a quantum computer are both given black-box or oracle access to certain
functions, then the quantum computer exponentially outperforms the classical computer [10–13].
Classical clients would therefore be highly motivated to delegate problems to quantum computers.
However, ensuring the privacy of their inputs is challenging. In particular, we’d have to solve the
following problems:
• Devise an encryption scheme which is secure against quantum computers and does not leak
information to the server about the client’s input.
• Ensure that the encryption scheme allows the client to recover the output of the computation
from the result provided by the quantum server.
• Ensure that the protocol is efficient for the client. Ideally, the number of rounds of interaction
between the client and the server as well as the client’s local computations, should scale at
most polynomially with the size of the input.
In spite of these stringent requirements, protocols that achieve these properties already exist and
are known collectively as delegated blind quantum computing schemes [14]. In such protocols, a
probabilistic polynomial-time client is able to delegate polynomial-time quantum computations to
a server in such a way that the client’s input (apart from an upper bound on its size) is kept hidden
from the server in an information-theoretic sense. All of the above schemes require the client and
the server to share at least one round of quantum communication. Universal Blind Quantum
Computation (UBQC), shown schematically in Figure 1, is an example of such a protocol [15].
The first blind delegation protocol was devised by Childs in [16], and since then these protocols
have been improved and extended in various works [17–24]. UBQC and related protocols require the
client and the server to exchange only one quantum message, while the rest of the communication
is classical [15, 25, 26]. This quantum message (which is sent by the client to the server) consists
of a tensor product of single-qubit states. As such, the only quantum capability the client needs is
the ability to prepare single-qubit states.
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Figure 1: Universal Blind Quantum Computation [15]. In UBQC, a classical client augmented with
the ability to prepare single-qubit states sends these qubits to the server along with instructions
on how to entangle and measure them in order to perform a computation. The M(δi) indicate
measurement instructions and the bi indicate the server’s responses for these instructions (if he
follows the protocol, these responses would represent the outcomes of the measurements that the
client instructed him to perform).
In this paper, we explore two questions pertaining to blind delegation protocols:
(1) Is there a scheme for blind quantum computing that is information-theoretically secure, and
that requires only classical communication between client and server?
(2) For schemes in which the client and the server are allowed one round of quantum communi-
cation, which functions can the client delegate to the server while maintaining information-
theoretic security? In particular, could the client delegate the evaluation of NP-hard func-
tions?
We provide some indication, based on complexity-theoretic conjectures, that the answer to the first
question is no. In other words, provided these complexity-theoretic conjectures hold, a classical
client running in polynomial time and communicating only classically with a server cannot delegate
arbitrary polynomial-time quantum computations to that server while keeping its input hidden
in an information-theoretic sense. Importantly, our result does not contradict recent results on
quantum fully homomorphic encryption with a classical client [27, 28], since those schemes are
based on cryptographic assumptions: we are interested only in information-theoretic security.
In answer to the second question, we provide a complexity-theoretic upper bound on the types
of functions that can be evaluated by UBQC-type protocols (i.e. protocols in which the client can
send one quantum message to the server1). We show that, under plausible complexity-theoretic
assumptions, this upper bound prevents the client from delegating NP-hard functions to the server.
Thus, allowing for quantum communication between the client and the server expands the set of
functions that the client can delegate to the server to include BQP, but not enough so as to include
NP as well.
1.1 Main results
We phrase our results formally using the concept of a generalised encryption scheme (GES) intro-
duced by Abadi, Feigenbaum and Killian [29], which is defined in Section 2.3. Roughly speaking,
a GES is a protocol between a probabilistic polynomial-time classical client and a computationally
unbounded server for computing on encrypted data. The client sends the server a description
1In fact our result concerns protocols in which the client and the server start with one round of quantum com-
munication, followed by polynomially-many rounds of classical communication. In other words, not only is there one
quantum message from the client to the server, but the server is also allowed to respond with a quantum message.
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of some function2 f : {0, 1}n → {0, 1}. Using some polynomial-time algorithm denoted E, the
client encrypts its input x, and sends E(x) to the server. The server and the client then interact
for a number of rounds which is polynomial in the length of x. Finally, using a polynomial-time
decryption algorithm denoted D, the client decrypts the server’s responses and obtains f(x) with
probability 1/2 + 1/poly(n). Importantly throughout the protocol, the server learns no more than
the length of x. Because the server is computationally unbounded, the scheme requires information-
theoretic security. Abadi et al. gave a complexity theoretic upper bound on the types of functions
that admit such a scheme. They showed that any function f that the client could delegate in a
GES must be contained in the class NP/poly∩ coNP/poly. We give a simplified proof of this result
in Section 2.3.
The GES framework allows us to restate the questions we address in this paper as follows:
(1) Can we design a GES for delegating BQP functions? Note that, by the Abadi et al. result, this
is the same as asking whether BQP ⊂ NP/poly∩coNP/poly. We will consider two variants on
the GES framework: one which allows the client to delegate sampling problems to the server,
and one in which the total communication between client and server is bounded by O(nd),
for some constant d > 0. For the former, we show that having such a scheme for quantum
sampling problems, like BosonSampling, implies that circuits exist which can compute the
permanent of a matrix more efficiently than we believe is possible. For the latter, having a
GES with bounded communication for polynomial-time quantum computation implies that
BQP ⊂ MA/O(nd), and we argue that this containment is unlikely by providing an oracle
separation between these classes.
(2) If we change the GES framework to allow one round of quantum communication between the
client and the server, what functions can the client delegate to the server? We answer this
question by “quantising” the Abadi et al. result and showing that such functions would be
contained in QCMA/qpoly ∩ coQCMA/qpoly (a quantum analogue of NP/poly ∩ coNP/poly).
We also show that QCMA/qpoly ∩ coQCMA/qpoly is unlikely to contain NP-hard functions.
1.1.1 Generalised encryption scheme for BQP decision problems
As we have mentioned, for the case of decision problems, Abadi et al. showed that the class of
problems that a client can delegate to a server using the GES framework is contained in NP/poly∩
coNP/poly. They also observed that if NP-hard functions could be delegated by the client using
a GES, then NP ⊂ NP/poly ∩ coNP/poly, and, in particular, NP ⊂ coNP/poly. Yap showed that
having such a containment leads to a collapse of the polynomial hierarchy at the third level [30].
In other words, it seems unlikely that NP-hard problems would admit a GES.
What about BQP-hard functions? The Abadi et al. result implies that having a GES for BQP-
hard functions leads to BQP ⊂ NP/poly∩ coNP/poly. While we would like to argue, similarly, that
such a containment leads to a collapse of the polynomial hierarchy, even BQP = P isn’t known to
lead to such a collapse. We instead consider a modified GES in which the total communication
between the client and the server is upper bounded by a polynomial of fixed degree, d > 0, in the
size of the input3. In that case, it can be shown that BQP ⊂ MA/O(nd) ∩ coMA/O(nd) (see the
proof of Theorem 7). We argue that this containment is unlikely based on the following result,
which we prove in Section 3:
Theorem 1. For each d ∈ N, there exists an oracle Od such that BQPOd is not contained in
(MA/O(nd))Od.
Essentially, the theorem shows that relative to an oracle Od, there are problems that can be
solved by a polynomial-time quantum algorithm, but which a classical client cannot delegate to
2Unless otherwise specified, we restrict our attention to decision problems. This is why the function f has the
codomain {0, 1}.
3Note that we impose no such restriction on the running time of the client.
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a server in a GES with bounded communication. Since the oracle is parameterised by d, we are
in fact defining a family of oracles. The specific problem on which the oracle Od is based is a
version of Simon’s problem [11]. Simon’s problem is the following: for an input of size n, and
given oracle access to a function g : {0, 1}n → {0, 1}n that is guaranteed to be either an injective
function, or a 2-to-1 and periodic function4, the task is to decide which is the case. Simon provided
a polynomial-time quantum algorithm for solving this problem, thus showing that it belongs to
BQP (relative to the function oracle). For the case in which one should accept when the function
is 2-to-1, the problem can be shown to be outside of MA (relative to the function oracle). As such,
Simon’s problem provides an oracle separation between BQP and MA.
In Simon’s original construction, the oracle function is the same for all inputs of size n. Note
that, this version of the problem can be solved with one bit of advice: for all inputs of size n, the
advice bit simply specifies whether the function is 1-to-1 or 2-to-1 and periodic. Therefore such a
setup would not be useful in our case. For this reason, in our proof of Theorem 1, the function that
the oracle provides access to is input-dependent. The problem we define, relative to this oracle, is
again to decide whether the function is 1-to-1 or the function is 2-to-1 and periodic. However, we
can show that, by considering a sufficiently large domain for these functions — in other words, by
letting g : {0, 1}nD → {0, 1}nD for some D > d — the problem is not contained in (MA/O(nd))Od ,
but is nevertheless contained in BQP. The proof uses a diagonalisation argument and can be found
in Section 3.
Unfortunately, the same oracle cannot be used to separate BQP from NP/poly. This is because
D is a function of d; to prove a separation with respect to NP/poly, where the length of the advice
string can be any polynomial, we would have to find an oracle that works for all possible values of
d. It would be interesting to see whether the oracle that Raz and Tal [31] recently used to prove
a separation between BQP and PH could also be used in order to separate BQP from NP/poly, or
even from PH/poly. We leave this as an open problem.
One can argue that oracle results do not constitute compelling evidence on the relationships
between complexity classes. For example, it has been known for a while that there exist oracles
O1, O2 such that P
O1 6= NPO1 but PO2 = NPO2 , and that, while IP = PSPACE, there is an
oracle such that IPO 6= PSPACEO. Nonetheless, oracles allow us to study the query complexity
of problems in different models of computation. In fact, there are situations in practice where
computer programs are restricted to making black-box calls to functions in order to determine
their properties [32]. Apart from this, oracle results have also inspired a number of important
developments in algorithms and complexity theory5. For more arguments concerning the usefulness
of oracle results, see Section 1.3 of [34].
1.1.2 Generalised encryption scheme for BQP sampling problems
We consider what would happen if we have a generalised encryption scheme which allowed a
client to delegate a sampling problem, such as BosonSampling, to the server. BosonSampling,
defined by Aaronson and Arkhipov in [35], is essentially the problem of simulating the statistics
of photons (bosons) passing through a linear optics network. One starts with a configuration
of identical photons in known locations (referred to as modes). The photons then pass through
the linear optics network, which consists of optical elements (beamsplitters and phase shifters).
Finally, one performs a measurement to determine the new locations of the photons in the output
modes of the system. The reason this is referred to as a sampling problem is because we have
a probability distribution over the different configurations of photons in the output modes. In
exact BosonSampling, which is the problem we consider, the task is to produce a sample from
that probability distribution. Aaronson and Arkhipov showed that the probability of observing
a particular configuration of photons is proportional to the squared permanent of a matrix that
4In other words, there exists a period s ∈ {0, 1}n, s 6= 0n, such that for all x, y ∈ {0, 1}n, x 6= y, it is the case
that g(x) = g(y) iff. x = s⊕ y.
5A notable example is the fact that Simon’s oracle separation between BPP and BQP led to Shor’s algorithm for
factoring and computing the discrete logarithm [33]
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can be obtained efficiently from the description of the optical network. They also showed that no
polynomial-time probabilistic algorithm can sample from this distribution, unless the polynomial
hierarchy collapses at the third level [35]. As such, while a quantum computer could simulate the
optical network and sample from the target distribution in polynomial time, it seems unlikely that
classical computers could do the same.
In a GES for exact BosonSampling, the client’s input would be a description of a linear
optics network6. The client would like to delegate to the server the task of sampling from the
BosonSampling distribution associated with this network, while keeping the description of the
network hidden from the server. In other words, upon interacting with the server and decrypting
its responses, the client should obtain a sample from the BosonSampling distribution. At the
same time, the server learns at most an upper bound on the size of the network. We show the
following:
Theorem 2. If exact BosonSampling admits a GES, then for any matrix X ∈ {−1, 0, 1}n×n,
there exist circuits of size 2
n−Ω
(
n
logn
)
, making polynomially-sized queries to an NPNP oracle, for
computing the permanent of X.
Computing the permanent of a matrix is a problem known to be #P-hard. By Toda’s theorem,
this means that if computing the permanent were possible at any level of the polynomial hierarchy,
the hierarchy would collapse at that level [36]. Moreover, the best known algorithm for computing
the permanent, by Bjo¨rklund, has a run-time of 2
n−Ω
(√
n/log(n)
)
[37]. Prior to that, the leading
algorithm for computing the permanent was Ryser’s algorithm, developed over 50 years ago, which
requires O(n2n) arithmetic operations [38]. We conjecture that the circuits of Theorem 2 do not
exist and, thus, that there can be no GES for BosonSampling. The proof of this result can be
found in Section 4.
1.1.3 Quantum generalised encryption scheme
While having a GES for delegating BQP computations seems unlikely, we know that giving the
client some minimal quantum capabilities removes this limitation: schemes such as UBQC exist
which allow for the information-theoretically secure blind delegation of quantum computations.
In the spirit of the Abadi et al. result, it is natural to consider quantum generalised encryption
schemes (or QGES), in which the client is no longer classical, and investigate the complexity-
theoretic upper bounds on functions that admit such a protocol. For the QGES, we are still
assuming information-theoretic security and that the encryption scheme leaks at most the size
of the input. However, unlike the GES, the client is now assumed to be a quantum computer
performing polynomial-time computations7. Additionally, the client and the server perform one
round of quantum communication at the beginning of the protocol. The rest of the communication
is classical.
We impose one other restriction on the QGES, known as offline-ness. Roughly speaking, an
offline protocol is one in which the client does not need to commit to any particular input (of
a given size), after having sent the quantum message to the server. The quantum message only
depends on the size of the input. We note that offline-ness is a property which UBQC and all
other currently known blind quantum computing protocols share. From a practical perspective,
this presents the client with the option of sending the first quantum message to the server and
deciding at a later time on which input the server should perform the computation. One could
imagine, for instance, that the client and the server have access to a quantum channel for a limited
amount of time. In practice, such a situation can occur if the communication between the parties
6In principle, one could also specify the configuration of the photons in the input modes as part of the client’s
input. Equivalently, however, one can always initialise the input modes to some fixed initial state, and produce
whichever starting state is in fact desired by altering the linear optics network.
7It should be noted that our upper bound on the power of QGES schemes also holds if the client is restricted to
BPP computations (as is the case in UBQC), since BPP ⊆ BQP.
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is mediated by a satellite, as is the case with satellite-based quantum-key distribution [39]. In this
case, the satellite is in the line of sight of the two parties for only a few minutes at a time. Our
result is the following:
Theorem 3. The class of functions that a client can delegate to a server in an offline QGES is
contained in QCMA/qpoly ∩ coQCMA/qpoly.
Note that the class QCMA/qpoly∩ coQCMA/qpoly can be seen as a quantum analogue of the class
NP/poly ∩ coNP/poly which we encounter in the GES case. We therefore view Theorem 3 as a
“quantisation” of the Abadi et al. bound on the power of generalised encryption schemes.
Again, in the spirit of the Abadi et al. result, one can ask whether NP-complete functions are
contained in QCMA/qpoly ∩ coQCMA/qpoly. In other words: does giving quantum capabilities to
the client increase the class of functions that it can securely delegate so that this class contains
NP? We give an indication that the answer is no:
Theorem 4. NP ⊂ QCMA/qpoly ∩ coQCMA/qpoly implies coNPNPNP ⊆ NPNPPromiseQMA.
Note that if PromiseQMA in the above expression were replaced with NP, this would imply a
collapse of the polynomial hierarchy at the third level. Our result is as close to a collapse of the
polynomial hierarchy as one can reasonably hope to get, given a quantum hypothesis. Hence, while
a QGES does allow the client to delegate BQP computations, it seems to be no more useful than
the regular GES for delegating NP-hard functions.
One could ask why we would even be interested in delegating NP-hard problems to a quantum
computer, given that we do not expect quantum computers to be able to solve such problems in
polynomial time [40]. First of all, from a theoretical perspective, note that in the QGES formalism
we are not limiting the server to polynomial-time quantum computations, but instead assuming
that it has unbounded computational power. Therefore, the way to view this result is not as “how
can a client blindly delegate the evaluation of NP-hard functions to a quantum computer?” but
as “can quantum communication help in blindly delegating the evaluation of NP-hard functions to
an unbounded server?”.
From a practical perspective, while we do not believe that quantum computers can solve NP-
complete problems in polynomial time, they could, in principle, solve such problems quadratically
faster than classical computers, thanks to Grover’s algorithm [41]. Even though the speedup of
Grover’s algorithm is only quadratic, from (say) 2n to 2n/2, our result is only concerned with
the length of the computation performed on the client side, and therefore applies to Grover’s
algorithm just as it would to a quantum algorithm achieving exponential speedup. In fact, as
is mentioned in [42], there are NP-complete problems for which quantum computers provide a
superpolynomial speedup, at least with respect to the best known classical algorithms. Our no-go
theorem indicates that clients cannot exploit such speedups by delegating the computation to the
server, even when allowing some quantum communication, if we also want to keep their inputs
hidden in an information-theoretic sense.
Proofs of these results can be found in Section 5.
1.2 Related work
As mentioned, the problem of computing on encrypted data was first considered by Rivest, Adleman
and Dertouzos [1], which then led to the development of homomorphic encryption and eventually
to fully homomorphic encryption with Gentry’s scheme [8]. Since then there have been many other
FHE protocols relying on more standard cryptographic assumptions and having more practical
requirements [43–45].
While FHE is similar to the GES in many respects, there are also significant differences. For
starters, FHE protocols have only one round of interaction between the client and the server,
whereas a GES allows for polynomially many rounds. Additionally, the GES assumes the server is
computationally unbounded and hence requires information-theoretic security. In contrast, FHE
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relies on computational security. More precisely FHE schemes have semantic security against
polynomial-time (quantum) algorithms [8].
The problem of quantum computing on encrypted data was introduced by Childs [16] and
Arrighi and Salvail [46]. Further development eventually led to UBQC [15, 25] and a scheme of
Broadbent [26]. The latter was followed by the construction of the first schemes for quantum fully
homomorphic encryption (QFHE) [47, 48]. For a review of blind quantum computing and related
protocols see [14].
In the QFHE schemes of [47, 48], the server is a polynomial-time quantum computer and the
client has some quantum capabilities of its own, although it is not able to perform universal
quantum computations. Both the size of the exchanged messages and the number of operations
of the client are polynomial in the size of the input. More recently, QFHE schemes have been
proposed in which the client is completely classical [27, 28]. Similar to FHE, these protocols
rely on computational assumptions for security [49] and involve one round of back and forth
interaction between the client and the server. QFHE with information-theoretic security (and a
computationally unbounded server) has been considered by Yu et al. in [50], where it is shown that
it is impossible to have such a scheme for arbitrary unitary operations (or even arbitrary reversible
classical computations). This result was later reproved by Newmann and Shi using quantum
random-access codes [51]. In relation to our work, QFHE with information-theoretic security can
be viewed as a one-round QGES in which the server responds with a quantum message. The
complexity-theoretic upper bound we prove for QGES computable functions would then apply to
QFHE as well (provided that in QFHE we only leak the size of the input to the server), since our
proof allows a quantum message from the server just as well as a classical message.
The possibility of a classical client delegating a blind computation to a quantum server was
considered by Morimae and Koshiba [52]. They showed that such a protocol in which the client
leaks no information about its input to the server and there is only one round of interaction leads
to BQP ⊆ NP, considered an unlikely containment. We consider the more general setting of a GES
for BQP functions, where the number of rounds can be polynomial in the size of the input and
we allow the encryption to leak the size of the input. In fact, the question of whether a GES, as
defined in Abadi et al. [29], can exist for quantum computations was raised before by Dunjko and
Kashefi [53].
1.3 Future work
As we remarked in Section 1.1, in the case of decision problems, the existence of a GES with
bounded communication, for polynomial-time quantum computations, leads to the inclusion
BQP ⊂ MA/O(nd). We argue that this containment is unlikely based on the existence of an
oracle separating the two complexity classes. A natural extension of this result would be to prove
an oracle separation between BQP and NP/poly. This would provide more compelling evidence
that a GES for quantum computations cannot exist.
In the case of sampling problems, we showed that a GES for BosonSampling implies the
existence of circuits of size 2
n−Ω
(
n
logn
)
, making polynomially-sized queries to an NPNP oracle,
for computing matrix permanents. Can this result be strengthened so as to provide circuits for
computing matrix permanents that would be ruled out by the strong exponential-time hypothesis?
Alternatively, could one use other quantum sampling problems (such as random circuit sampling
or IQP problems [54]) to show that having a GES for such a problem leads to a collapse of the
polynomial hierarchy?
We also defined the QGES, which extends the GES by allowing the client to send one quantum
message to the server, and gave an upper bound for the set of functions that can be delegated
using an offline version of such a scheme. The immediate question one could ask is: what upper
bound can we give for an online QGES? A related question is: what upper bound can we give for
a QGES that allows all of the communication between the client and the server to be quantum?
The difficulty in answering both of these questions is that the offline property of the QGES is
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what allowed us to relate the set of functions that can be delegated to advice classes. Without this
property, it seems that a different approach would be needed to provide a complexity-theoretic
upper bound.
Another direction that can be explored has to do with the size of the quantum communication
between the client and the server. In a QGES in which the client’s quantum message is logarithmic
or poly-logarithmic in the size of the input (while the classical communication is still polynomial),
is it still possible to delegate BQP functions to the server? Of course, this question only makes
sense if we assume that the client is not able to perform BQP computations itself.
2 Preliminaries
2.1 Quantum information and computation basics
In this subsection we provide a few basic notions regarding quantum information and quantum
computation and refer the reader to the appropriate references for a more in depth presentation
[55,56].
A quantum state (or a quantum register) is a unit vector in a complex Hilbert space, H. We
denote quantum states, using standard Dirac notation, as |ψ〉 ∈ H, called a ‘ket’ state. The dual
of this state is denoted 〈ψ|, called a ‘bra’, and is a member of the dual space H⊥. We will only
be concerned with finite-dimensional Hilbert spaces. Qubits are states in two-dimensional Hilbert
spaces. Traditionally, one fixes an orthonormal basis for such a space, called computational basis,
and denotes the basis vectors as |0〉 and |1〉. Gluing together systems to express the states of
multiple qubits is achieved through tensor product, denoted ⊗. The notation |ψ〉⊗n denotes a state
comprising of n copies of |ψ〉. If a state |ψ〉 ∈ H1 ⊗ H2 cannot be expressed as |a〉 ⊗ |b〉, for any
|a〉 ∈ H1 and any |b〉 ∈ H2, we say that the state is entangled.
Quantum mechanics dictates that there are two ways to change a quantum state: unitary
evolution and measurement. Unitary evolution involves acting with some unitary operation U
(so UU † = U †U = I, where the † operation denotes the hermitian adjoint, obtained through
transposing and complex conjugating) on |ψ〉, thus producing the mapping |ψ〉 → U |ψ〉.
Measurement, in its most basic form, involves expressing a state |ψ〉 in a particular orthonormal
basis, B, and then choosing one of the basis vectors as the state of the system post-measurement.
The index of that vector is the classical outcome of the measurement. The post-measurement
vector is chosen at random and the probability of obtaining a vector |v〉 ∈ B is given by | 〈v|ψ〉 |2.
There are more general types of measurement, however this is the only type that is relevant to our
paper.
States denoted by kets are also referred to as pure states as they are states of maximal informa-
tion for a quantum system. In other words, having a pure state for a particular quantum system
means knowing all there is to know about the state of that system. When maximal information is
not available, states are referred to as mixed and can be represented using density matrices. These
are positive semidefinite, trace one, hermitian operators. The density matrix of a pure state |ψ〉 is
ρ = |ψ〉 〈ψ|.
An essential operation concerning density matrices is the partial trace. This provides a way of
obtaining the density matrix of a subsystem that is part of a larger system. Partial trace is linear,
and is defined as follows. Given two density matrices ρ1 and ρ2 with Hilbert spaces H1 and H2,
we have that:
ρ1 = Tr2(ρ1 ⊗ ρ2) ρ2 = Tr1(ρ1 ⊗ ρ2) (1)
In the first case one is ‘tracing out’ system 2, whereas in the second case we trace out system
1. This property together with linearity completely defines the partial trace. For if we take any
general density matrix, ρ, on H1 ⊗H2, expressed as:
ρ =
∑
i,i′,j,j′
aii′jj′ |i〉1
〈
i′
∣∣
1
⊗ |j〉2
〈
j′
∣∣
2
(2)
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where {|i〉} ({|i′〉}) and {|j〉} ({|j′〉}) are orthonormal bases for H1 and H2, if we would like to
trace out subsystem 2, for example, we would then have:
Tr2(ρ) = Tr2
 ∑
i,i′,j,j′
aii′jj′ |i〉1
〈
i′
∣∣
1
⊗ |j〉2
〈
j′
∣∣
2
 = ∑
i,i′,j
aii′jj |i〉1
〈
i′
∣∣
1
(3)
An important result, concerning the relationship between mixed states and pure states which
we use in our paper, is the fact that any mixed state can be purified. In other words, for any
mixed state ρ over some Hilbert space H1 one can always find a pure state |ψ〉 ∈ H1 ⊗ H2 such
that dim(H1) = dim(H2)8 and:
Tr2(|ψ〉 〈ψ|) = ρ (4)
Moreover, the purification |ψ〉 is not unique and so another important result is the fact that if
|φ〉 ∈ H1 ⊗ H2 is another purification of ρ then there exists a unitary U , acting only on H2 (the
additional system that was added to purify ρ) such that:
|φ〉 = (I ⊗ U) |ψ〉 (5)
We will refer to this as the purification principle.
Quantum computation is most easily expressed in the quantum gates model. In this frame-
work, gates are unitary operations which act on groups of qubits. As with classical computation,
universal quantum computation is achieved by considering a fixed set of quantum gates which can
approximate any unitary operation up to a chosen precision. The most common universal set of
gates is given by:
X =
[
0 1
1 0
]
Z =
[
1 0
0 −1
]
H =
1√
2
[
1 1
1 −1
]
T =
[
1 0
0 eipi/4
]
CNOT =

1 0 0 0
0 1 0 0
0 0 0 1
0 0 1 0

In order, the operations are known as Pauli X and Pauli Z, Hadamard, the T-gate and controlled-
NOT. Note that general controlled-U operations are operations performing the mapping |0〉 |ψ〉 →
|0〉 |ψ〉, |1〉 |ψ〉 → |1〉U |ψ〉. The matrices express the action of each operator on the computational
basis. A classical outcome for a particular quantum computation can be obtained by measuring
the quantum state resulting from the application of a sequence of quantum gates.
The final notion which needs mentioning is the quantum SWAP test. This is a simple procedure
for determining whether two quantum states |ψ〉 , |φ〉 ∈ H are close to each other or far apart. We
express closeness in terms of the absolute value of their inner product | 〈ψ|φ〉 |. The test involves
preparing a qubit in the state (|0〉+ |1〉)/√2 and performing a controlled-SWAP operation between
that qubit and the state |ψ〉 |φ〉. SWAP is defined by the mapping |ψ〉 |φ〉 → |φ〉 |ψ〉, so we obtain
the state: |0〉 |ψ〉 |φ〉+ |1〉 |φ〉 |ψ〉√
2
If one then applies a Hadamard operation to the first qubit and measures it in the computational
basis it can be shown that the probability of obtaining outcome |0〉 is (1 + | 〈ψ|φ〉 |2)/2.
2.2 Complexity theory
2.2.1 Decision problems
We use standard complexity theory notation and refer the reader to the Complexity Zoo [57] for
the definitions of standard complexity classes. Briefly, P is the class of decision problems9 that
8One could allow for purifications in larger systems, but in our paper we restrict attention to same dimensions.
9A decision problem is a problem in which for every input x ∈ {0, 1}∗, the output is either “yes” or ”no”. A
decision problem can be represented as either a function f : {0, 1}∗ → {0, 1}, or as a subset of {0, 1}∗ representing
the “yes” instances to the problem. Such a set is known as a language.
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can be solved by a deterministic polynomial-time classical algorithm (or Turing machine). If the
algorithm is allowed to use randomness (and we require that it outputs the correct answer with
probability greater than 2/3) the corresponding class is BPP. The class of decision problems
for which “yes” instances admit a polynomial-sized proof string (or witness) that can be verified
by the polynomial-time algorithm is known as NP10. The analogous class for “no” instances is
coNP, referred to as the complement of NP. Once again, if the polynomial-time algorithm also
uses randomness the corresponding classes are MA and coMA, respectively. The class of decision
problems that can be decided in polynomial-time by a quantum algorithm is denoted BQP. There
are two quantum analogues of MA. One is QMA which is the class of decision problems in which
“yes” instances admit a quantum witness, of polynomially-many qubits, that can be verified by a
polynomial-time quantum algorithm. The other is QCMA, which is the same as QMA except the
witness is a classical bit-string, rather than a quantum state. Complements of these classes are
denoted coQMA and coQCMA, respectively. For all classes mentioned here, we say that a problem
P is hard for the class C if for all problems P ′ ∈ C there exists a deterministic polynomial-time
algorithm mapping each “yes” instance of P ′ to a “yes” instance of P and each “no” instance of
P ′ to a “no” instance of P , respectively. We also say that P is complete for C if P is hard for C
and P ∈ C.
As a slight abuse of terminology, we will sometimes say “BPP machine/algorithm” or “BQP
machine/algorithm” to mean either a probabilistic polynomial-time algorithm, or a polynomial-
time quantum algorithm, respectively. Analogous terminology may be used for the other classes
as well11.
An important category of complexity classes that we encounter throughout the paper is that
of advice classes. Let us provide a definition of this concept:
Definition 1. Let C be a complexity class and F a family of functions f : N → {0, 1}∗. The
complexity class C/F , known as C with F advice, is the set of all languages L, for which there
exists an L′ ∈ C and a function f ∈ F such that for all x ∈ {0, 1}∗, x ∈ L iff. 〈x, f(|x|)〉 ∈ L′.
As an example, consider the class P/poly. This consists of all languages that can be decided by
a deterministic polynomial-time algorithm, that receives polynomially-many bits of advice for all
inputs of the same length. In other words, for all inputs x ∈ {0, 1}n, the algorithm also receives
some string a ∈ {0, 1}poly(n), aiding it in deciding whether to accept x or not. Analogously NP/poly
consists of languages that can be decided by a polynomial-time verifier receiving a witness for “yes”
instances and a trusted advice string that only depends on the size of the input. We also encounter
the class MA/O(nd) in which the size of the advice string is O(nd), for some fixed constant d.
Some of the advice classes used in the paper are not covered by Definition 1. For instance, the
class BPP/rpoly denotes the set of languages that can be decided by a BPP machine that receives
randomised polynomial-size advice. In other words, for all inputs x ∈ {0, 1}n, the probabilistic
algorithm also receives some string a ∈ {0, 1}poly(n), that is drawn from a distribution Dn. We
can see that this does not satisfy Definition 1 since the advice string is not the result of some
deterministic function, but is a sample from a probability distribution. It should therefore be
understood that rpoly corresponds to polynomial-size advice drawn from a probability distribution
that only depends on the size of the input. An important result we use, concerning randomised
advice, is the following:
Theorem 5 (Aaronson [58]). MA/rpoly = MA/poly = NP/poly
It should be noted that the equalities are only known to hold for classes of decision problems.
We can similarly have quantum advice. As an example, the class BQP/qpoly denotes the set
of languages that can be decided by a BQP machine that receives as advice a quantum state of
10There is an equivalent definition of NP as the set of all decision problems that can be solved by a non-deterministic
polynomial-time algorithm (or Turing machine). The non-deterministic part simply means that the algorithm can
guess a witness.
11For instance, a “QCMA machine” refers to a polynomial-time quantum algorithm that also receives a classical
witness string.
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polynomially-many qubits. In other words, for all inputs x ∈ {0, 1}n, the quantum algorithm also
receives a quantum state |ψn〉 ∈ Hn, such that dim(Hn) = 2poly(n). Hence, the suffix qpoly will
indicate polynomially-sized quantum advice and represents a quantum state of polynomially-many
qubits that only depends on the size of the input.
The concept of oracles is also used throughout the paper. Briefly, an oracle is a black box
function that can be invoked by an algorithm (either classical or quantum) in order to obtain the
solution to some problem in one time step. For example, the class of problems which can be solved
by a deterministic polynomial-time algorithm with access to some oracle function O : {0, 1}∗ →
{0, 1} is denoted PO. If O is an oracle for some NP-complete problem, then the corresponding
class is denoted PNP. Oracles can be used to define the polynomial hierarchy. The zeroth level of
the polynomial hierarchy is given by the classes ΣP0 = P, Π
P
0 = P. The k’th level of the hierarchy
is then defined as ΣPk = NP
ΣPk−1 , ΠPk = coNP
ΣPk−1 . Finally, the polynomial hierarchy is defined as
PH = ∪k≥0ΣPk . We say that the polynomial hierarchy collapses at level k iff. ΣPk = ΠPk . While not
a decision class, we also mention #P which is the class of all functions f : {0, 1}∗ → N that take
as input a description of a polynomial-time algorithm and output the number of inputs that the
algorithm accepts (i.e. the number of “yes” instances). An important result in complexity theory
is Toda’s theorem [36], which states that PH ⊆ P#P.
For quantum classes, oracles are viewed as unitary operations that perform mappings of the
form UO |x〉 |y〉 = |x〉 |y ⊕O(x)〉, where O is the oracle function. Additionally, whenever a result
involving complexity classes remains true when those classes are given access to an oracle, O, we
say that the result relativises.
2.2.2 Sampling problems and BosonSampling
This section discusses sampling problems. These are problems for which the input specifies a prob-
ability distribution and the goal is to sample either exactly or approximately from that distribution.
In this paper, we will only be interested in exact sampling and specifically in the BosonSampling
problem, defined by Aaronson and Arkhipov [35]. As mentioned in the introduction, in Boson-
Sampling, identical photons (bosons) are sent through a linear optics network and non-adaptive
measurements are performed to count the number of photons in each mode. In more detail, for
a quantum system with m modes and n photons, the basis states of the system are of the form
S = (s1, ...sm), where si denotes the number of photons in mode i (so s1 + ...+ sm = n). A general
state, is then a state of the form:
|ψ〉 =
∑
S
αS |S〉 , with
∑
S
|αS |2 = 1 (6)
Note that the number of basis states is M =
(
m+n−1
n
)
. The action of the linear optics network
can be expressed as a matrix A ∈ Um,n, where Um,n is the set of all m × n column-orthonormal
matrices. Let AS be the matrix obtained by taking si copies of the i’th row of A, for all i ≤ m.
If the initial state of the system consists of one photon in each of the first n modes (it is assumed
that m ≥ n), a state denoted as |1n〉 = |1, ..., 1, 0, ..., 0〉, then it can be shown (see [35]) that the
probability of observing the state S, upon passing the photons through the network described by
A and measuring the number of photons in each mode, will be:
Pr(S) =
|Per(AS)|2
s1!s2!...sm!
(7)
where Per(M) denotes the permanent of a matrix M = (mij)i,j≤n, and is defined as:
Per(M) =
∑
σ∈Sn
n∏
i=1
mi,σ(i) (8)
with Sn the symmetric group of all permutations of the elements 1 up to n.
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Exact BosonSampling is then the problem of sampling from the distribution defined by
Equation 7. This problem is believed to be hard for classical computers and to explain why we
first need to state a result known as Stockmeyer’s approximate counting method :
Theorem 6 (Stockmeyer [59]). Let f : {0, 1}n → {0, 1} be a function that can be computed by a
deterministic polynomial-time algorithm and let:
p =
1
2n
∑
x∈{0,1}n
f(x) (9)
Then for all g ≥ 1 + 1/poly(n) there exists a BPPNP algorithm that computes p to within a multi-
plicative factor of g12.
Now, suppose there existed a BPP algorithm that, given A (the description of the linear optics
network) as input, could sample from the distribution of Equation 7. This algorithm can be viewed
as a deterministic polynomial-time computable function F that, given A and a string r ∈ {0, 1}p(n),
drawn from the uniform distribution, for some polynomial p, produces a vector S = (s1, ...sm) (of
the form described above). The fact that this algorithm can sample from the BosonSampling
distribution can be expressed mathematically as:
Pr
r←R{0,1}p(n)
(F (A, r) = S) =
|Per(AS)|2
s1!s2!...sm!
(10)
where r ←R {0, 1}p(n) denotes the fact that r was drawn uniformly at random from the set
{0, 1}p(n).
Consider now the state |1n〉 (or any state in which all si are either 0 or 1). What is the
probability of observing |1n〉 in the output modes? Using Equation 7 we see that it is Pr(|1n〉) =
|Per(A|1n〉)|2. We will define a function f as follows:
f(A, r) =
{
0, if F (A, r) 6= |1n〉
1, if F (A, r) = |1n〉 (11)
Note that f is computable in polynomial time (since it simply involves evaluating F and testing
whether the output is |1n〉). The probability that the BPP algorithm produces the output |1n〉 can
then be expressed as:
Pr
r←R{0,1}p(n)
(F (A, r) = |1n〉) = 1
2p(n)
∑
r∈{0,1}p(n)
f(A, r) (12)
But this sum can be estimated, up to multiplicative error, in BPPNP using Stockmeyer’s method.
In other words, there is a BPPNP algorithm for estimating |Per(A|1n〉)|2. It is shown in [35] that
one can consider any matrix M ∈ {−1, 0, 1}n×n and embed it in A (with only an added polynomial
overhead) so that the probability of sampling the |1n〉 state is proportional to |Per(M)|2. By the
above argument, this means that computing a multiplicative estimate for the squared permanent
of a matrix over {−1, 0, 1} is in BPPNP. However, computing such an estimate is #P-hard [35]. It
is also known that BPPNP is contained in the third level of the polynomial hierarchy [60], which
leads us to conclude, using Toda’s theorem, that the polynomial hierarchy collapses at the third
level. Such a collapse is regarded as unlikely and therefore the existence of an efficient classical
algorithm for BosonSampling is also considered unlikely.
12In other words, the algorithm computes p˜ such that p/g ≤ p˜ ≤ gp.
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2.3 Generalised Encryption Scheme (GES)
The basis of most of the results in our paper is the generalised encryption scheme. We state its
definition from [29]:
Definition 2 ( [29] Generalised Encryption Scheme (GES)). A generalised encryption scheme
(GES) is a two party protocol between a classical client C, and an unbounded server S, characterised
by:
• A function f : {0, 1}∗ → {0, 1}.
• A cleartext input x ∈ {0, 1}∗, for which the client wants to compute f(x).
• An expected polynomial-time key generation algorithm K which works as follows: for any x ∈
{0, 1}∗, with probability greater than 1/2 + 1/poly(|x|) we have (k, success) ← K(x), where
k ∈ {0, 1}poly(|x|). If the algorithm does not return success then we have (k′, fail) ← K(x),
where k′ ∈ {0, 1}poly(|x|).
• A polynomial-time deterministic algorithm E which works as follows: for any x ∈ {0, 1}∗,
k ∈ {0, 1}poly(|x|) and s ∈ {0, 1}poly(|x|) we have that y ← E(x, k, s), where y ∈ {0, 1}poly(|x|).
• A polynomial-time deterministic decryption algorithm D, which works as follows: for any
x ∈ {0, 1}∗, k ∈ {0, 1}poly(|x|) and s ∈ {0, 1}poly(|x|) we have that z ← D(s, k, x), where
z ∈ {0, 1}poly(|x|).
And satisfying the following properties:
1. There are m rounds of communication, such that m = poly(|x|). Denote the client’s message
in round i as ci and the server’s message as si.
2. On cleartext input x, C runs the key generation algorithm until success to compute a key
(k, success) = K(x). This happens before the communication between C and S is initiated,
and the key k is used throughout the protocol.
3. In round i of the protocol, C computes ci = E(x, k, si−1), where si−1 denotes the server’s
responses up to and including round i−1, i.e. 〈s0, s1...si−1〉. We assume that s0 is the empty
string. C then sends ci to S.
4. In round i of the protocol, S responds with si, such that si ∈ {0, 1}poly(|x|). Additionally,
the server’s responses are drawn probabilistically from a distribution which is consistent with
property 5.
5. At the end of the protocol, C computes z ← D(sm, k, x) and with probability 1/2+1/poly(|x|),
we have that z = f(x).
Let us provide some intuition for this definition. The purpose of a GES is to allow a client to
compute some f(x) which it cannot compute with its own resources. It does this by interacting
with a computationally powerful server for a number of rounds which is polynomial in the size
of the input. Importantly, the GES allows the client to hide some information about x from the
server. We make this statement more precise through the following definition:
Definition 3. Let X be a random variable denoting the input to a GES and T (X) a random
variable denoting the transcript of the protocol for input X (in other words T (X) is a collection of
all the messages exchanged between the client and the server, in a run of the GES, on input X).
We say that a GES leaks at most L(X) iff. X and T (X) are independent given L(X).
Finally, we state and give a simplified proof of the main theorem from [29], which we will use
throughout the paper:
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Theorem 7 ( [29] GES leaking size of input). If a function f admits a GES which leaks at most
the size of the input (i.e. L(X) = |X|), then f ∈ NP/poly ∩ coNP/poly.
Proof. Suppose that f admits a GES which leaks at most the size of the input. We start by first
considering the simplified case of a GES with only one round of interaction between the client and
the server. The protocol works as follows:
1. The client runs K(x) until success to produce an encryption key k.
2. The client computes the encrypted string y ← E(x, k, ‘’) (where the last entry is the empty
string) and sends it to the server.
3. The server sends a response r.
4. The client decrypts his response obtaining z ← D(r, k, x). With probability greater than
1/2 + 1/poly(|x|) we have that z = f(x).
Assuming the existence of the one-round GES, let us construct an MA/rpoly algorithm for
computing f(x). In other words we are going to construct a probabilistic polynomial-time algorithm
that receives a checkable witness and randomised polynomial-sized advice (the distribution from
which we sample the advice will be the same for inputs of the same size). The algorithm takes x
as input and works as follows:
• Denoting |x| = n, the algorithm receives as advice a string xn ∈ {0, 1}n as well as rn ∈
{0, 1}poly(n), where rn is the server’s response, in the one-round GES, when being sent yn ←
E(xn, kn, ‘’) from the client. Here kn is simply some key which can be used to encrypt xn.
The only reason we include xn as part of the advice is so that we can whether xn = x. If
this is the case then the algorithm simply decrypts rn obtaining f(x) with high probability.
The next steps assume that xn 6= x.
• From the assumption that the GES leaks at most the size of the input, there must be some
key k, such that yn ← E(x, k, ‘’). If there did not exist such a key and the server received yn
he would know that the input could not be x and thus learn more than the size of the input,
which is not allowed. More formally, it would mean that the input and the transcript of the
protocol are not independent, given the length of the input, since certain transcripts (certain
y’s) can only occur for certain inputs. The key, k, will be the witness that the algorithm
receives. The algorithm can check whether yn ← E(x, k, ‘’).
• The algorithm now simply computes z ← D(rn, k, x), which by the definition of the GES,
will be f(x) with probability greater than 1/2 + 1/poly(n).
We have therefore given an MA/rpoly algorithm for computing f(x). To recap, the MA part comes
from the fact that the algorithm is probabilistic, runs in polynomial time and receives the key k
as a witness. The advice is rpoly because the server’s response is drawn from some probability
distribution (which depends only on the length of the input). From Theorem 5, we know that
MA/rpoly = NP/poly hence f ∈ NP/poly. Since the GES frameworks requires that the key k must
exist irrespective of the value of f(x), this means that in our algorithm both the f(x) = 1 case
and the f(x) = 0 have a verifiable witness. Therefore it is also the case that f ∈ coNP/poly and
so f ∈ NP/poly ∩ coNP/poly.
We now need to generalise this to the case where the client and the server interact for a
polynomial number of rounds. Because the protocol is leaking at most the size of the input,
denoted n, any transcript of the protocol will only depend on n. Therefore we can make the
algorithm’s advice to be a complete transcript of the protocol drawn from the distribution of all
possible transcripts for inputs of length n. The witness would then be a key k that makes the
input x compatible with this transcript. From the definition of the GES this again guarantees that
we obtain the correct outcome with probability 1/2 + 1/poly(|x|).
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Note that if the total communication between the client and the server (i.e. the size of the
transcript) were bounded by O(nd), for some constant d > 0, the above argument shows that the
functions computable in this setting are contained in MA/O(nd)13. This is because, as we have
seen, the transcript is given as advice and so it will also be bounded in length by O(nd).
We have seen that the functions that can be delegated in a GES are contained in NP/poly ∩
coNP/poly. A question we might have regarding this result is: what can we say about
BPPNP/poly∩coNP/poly? In other words, if a BPP machine uses the GES as an oracle, does that
allow it to solve more problems? Intuitively, we would expect the answer to be no and indeed
using a result of Brassard [61] which shows that PNP∩coNP = NP∩ coNP, together with Adleman’s
theorem (that BPP ⊂ P/poly) [62] we prove the following:
Lemma 1. BPPNP/poly∩coNP/poly = NP/poly ∩ coNP/poly.
Proof. It is clear that NP/poly ∩ coNP/poly ⊆ BPPNP/poly∩coNP/poly, so only we need to show
that BPPNP/poly∩coNP/poly ⊆ NP/poly ∩ coNP/poly. To do this, we first use Adleman’s theorem
[62], that BPP ⊂ P/poly, which we know is relativising and have that BPPNP/poly∩coNP/poly ⊆
P/polyNP/poly∩coNP/poly. Next, it is easy to show that P/polyNP/poly∩coNP/poly ⊆ PNP/poly∩coNP/poly.
This is because the advice received by the P/poly machine can just as easily be obtained from the
NP/poly ∩ coNP/poly oracle. In other words, for any given input x and advice a for the P/poly
machine, the P machine can simply query the NP/poly∩coNP/poly oracle with x in order to obtain
the same advice a14. It then simulates the P/poly machine.
We have therefore reduced our problem to showing that PNP/poly∩coNP/poly ⊆ NP/poly ∩
coNP/poly. This can be done by adapting Brassard’s proof [61] that PNP∩coNP = NP ∩ coNP.
The essential part of that proof is to show that PNP∩coNP ⊆ NP, while the containment in coNP
follows by complementation. The idea is that for any PNP∩coNP algorithm, A, deciding some lan-
guage, we can devise an NP algorithm, NA, which also decides that language.
The NA algorithm will simulate A until it makes a query to the NP ∩ coNP oracle. At this
point NA can non-deterministically guess the response to this query. To do so, note that if some
language L ∈ NP∩ coNP then it is the case that L ∈ NP and Lc ∈ NP, where Lc is the complement
of L. In other words, there exist non-deterministic algorithms NL and NLc for deciding L and
Lc, respectively. Assuming A’s query is for the language L, NA will simulate NL, and for each
non-deterministic branch of this simulation it will then also simulate NLc . Since L and L
c are
complementary, it cannot happen that both theNL and theNLc parts of the branches are accepting.
We will therefore have branches in which both NL and NLc were rejecting and branches in which
either NL was accepting or NLc was accepting. These latter branches determine the answer to the
query for the NP ∩ coNP oracle. The NA algorithm will continue simulating A on these branches
and reject on all others.
We can see that the above reasoning would also work if the oracle was NP/poly ∩ coNP/poly
and the algorithm NA were an NP/poly algorithm receiving some advice string whose length
is polynomial in the size of the input. Our modified NA can continue to simulate the ora-
cle queries if we assume that the advice it receives is the concatenation of advices received by
the NP/poly ∩ coNP/poly oracle for all queries. Since the number of queries is polynomial, the
concatenation will also be polynomially bounded and hence constitutes a valid advice string for
an NP/poly algorithm. Therefore PNP/poly∩coNP/poly ⊆ NP/poly and through complementation
PNP/poly∩coNP/poly ⊆ NP/poly ∩ coNP/poly.
Because BPPNP/poly∩coNP/poly ⊆ PNP/poly∩coNP/poly, our result follows immediately.
13Strictly speaking, the above argument shows that such functions would be contained in MA with randomised
advice of size O(nd). However, the proof that MA/rpoly = NP/poly can be adapted to show that MA with O(nd)-size
randomised advice is the same as MA/O(nd
′
), with d′ ≥ d. Essentially, we can “derandomise” the advice using
deterministic advice of a larger size. The same argument cannot be used, however, to derandomise the MA part
of the algorithm and obtain NP/O(nd). This is because the size of the randomness used in MA is an arbitrary
polynomial.
14The fact that the oracle responds with a single bit (acceptance or rejection) is not a problem, since the P machine
can query the oracle for each bit of a.
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We end this section with an explanation of what it means to have a GES for sampling problems.
The client’s input, x, will be a description of a probability distribution, Dx : {0, 1}poly(|x|) → [0, 1].
Upon interacting with the server and applying the decryption procedure the client obtains z ←
D(sm, k, x) such that:
Pr(z ← D(sm, k, x)) = Pr(z ← Dx) (13)
In other words, the output of D(sm, k, x)) is distributed according to Dx. Just as with the GES
for decision problems, throughout the interaction, the server should only be able to learn |x|.
For the specific case of BosonSampling, with m modes and n photons, the input will be an
m × n column-orthonormal matrix A. The associated distribution will be the one described in
Section 2.2.2, namely:
Pr(S) =
|Per(AS)|2
s1!s2!...sm!
(14)
where S is a particular configuration of the n photons in the m modes.
The proof of Theorem 7 applies to the sampling case as it did to the decision case. We therefore
have that if the client can delegate exact sampling from Dx to the server, using the GES, there
exists an MA/rpoly algorithm for exactly sampling from Dx. Importantly, however, the result
of Theorem 5 no longer applies and we cannot equate this algorithm with a NP/poly sampling
algorithm. That result applies to decision classes. In fact, in the sampling case, it will be simpler
to consider the sampling algorithm as a BPPNP/rpoly algorithm (since MA/rpoly ⊆ BPPNP/rpoly).
In other words, the existence of a GES for sampling from Dx implies the existence of a probabilistic
polynomial-time algorithm, with an NP oracle, and which receives randomised polynomial-sized
advice, for sampling from Dx.
3 Oracle separation between BQP and MA/O(nd)
In order to prove Theorem 1 we will construct an oracle using a version of the complement of
Simon’s problem [11]. Recall that Simon’s problem is the following: given a function f : {0, 1}n →
{0, 1}n (for some n ∈ N) which is promised to be either 1-to-1 or have Simon’s property (f is 2-to-1
and there exists some s ∈ {0, 1}n, s 6= 0n, such that for x 6= y, f(x) = f(y) iff x = s ⊕ y), decide
which is the case. In particular, for Simon’s problem, the deciding algorithm should accept if the
function has Simon’s property and reject if it is a 1-to-1 function. The complement of this problem
simply flips these two conditions. If one is not given an explicit description of f but restricts access
to this function through an oracle then Simon’s problem can be used to separate BPP from BQP.
To be precise, the oracle is some function O : {0, 1}∗ → {0, 1}∗ such that for n ∈ N, if we consider
O restricted to the domain {0, 1}n, denoted On : {0, 1}n → {0, 1}n, On is either a 1-to-1 function
or a function satisfying Simon’s property. A language which is then contained in BQPO but not in
BPPO is L(O) = {0n|On is a function with Simon’s property} as shown in [11]. In fact, as we’ve
mentioned before, the complement of this language15 can be used to separate BQPO and NPO [34].
Lemma 2, which we prove below, is essentially a proof of this fact for a slightly different version of
the oracle.
Before proving Lemma 2, let us first address a technical point. As we remarked in the intro-
duction, an unconstrained GES for BQP would imply BQP ∈ NP/poly ∩ coNP/poly. Therefore,
we would ideally like to construct an oracle to separate BQPO and NP/polyO. The intuition in
constructing this hypothetical oracle would be following: instead of considering a function On
for each input length n, we consider a function Ox, for each input string x ∈ {0, 1}n. In other
words, for a fixed input length, n, there will be 2n functions which need to be decided. But the
NPO machine receives only a polynomial amount of advice, which is the same for all of these 2n
functions. Therefore this advice should be insufficient to help the NPO machine in deciding all of
these inputs. Formalising this intuition for any polynomial is problematic, as will become clear
15Note that Simon’s problem is a promise problem, so when speaking about the complement of L(O) we are in
fact referring to Lc(O) = {0n|On is a 1-to-1 function}.
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later (see the last paragraph of the proof of Lemma 4). For this reason, we will fix the degree of
the polynomial and prove that BQPO 6⊆ (MA/O(nd))O. To do this, let us first prove the separation
between BQPO and NPO, for our specific oracle.
Lemma 2. There exists an oracle O, based on the complement of Simon’s problem, such that
BQPO 6⊆ NPO.
Proof. The separation of BQP and NP with respect to an oracle has been shown a number of times
before, [10, 63, 64], including with the complement of Simon’s problem. However, we prove this
lemma for our particular version of Simon’s problem where instead of assigning a function to each
input length, we assign different functions to different inputs.
We proceed by defining an oracle O and a language which we refer to as the complement of
Simon’s problem or coSimon(O), such that coSimon(O) ∈ BQPO and coSimon(O) 6∈ NPO. We
start with the latter as it also clarifies what the oracle should do:
coSimon(O) = {〈1n, i〉 |i ∈ {0, 1}n and f(x) ≡ O(1n, i, x) is a 1-to-1 function} (15)
Strictly speaking, the problem we are defining is a promise problem, so the set defined above is
the set of yes instances to the problem, whereas the set of no instances is not the complement but
the set:
{〈1n, i〉 |i ∈ {0, 1}n and f(x) ≡ O(1n, i, x) is a Simon function} (16)
Here, by “Simon function” we mean a function having Simon’s property.
It is clear from this definition that the oracle O is the one providing the functions for which
we want test whether they are 1-to-1 or have Simon’s property. Of course, the whole point is to
restrict access to the descriptions of those functions and force the algorithm solving the problem to
perform queries to the oracle. It is also clear that for any such O, coSimon(O) will be contained in
BQPO since we can just run Simon’s algorithm on the given input and flip acceptance and rejection.
As is standard in quantum query complexity, we assume that the behaviour of the quantum oracle
is to perform the unitary operation |1n〉 |i〉 |x〉 |y〉 →O |1n〉 |i〉 |x〉 |O(1n, i, x)⊕ y〉.
The oracle O can be viewed as some function taking as input the tuple (n, i, x) and outputting
fi(x), where fi : {0, 1}n → {0, 1}n is a function which is either bijective or has Simon’s property.
Essentially n, which is given in unary, specifies the domain size of our functions, i is an index for
a particular function and x is the value on which we evaluate fi. These last two elements of the
tuple are specified in binary and the oracle should be defined for all n ∈ N and all i, x ∈ {0, 1}n.
We will denote the set of functions used by the oracle for domain size n as Fn, in other words:
Fn = {fi|i ∈ {0, 1}n and fi is defined as fi(x) ≡ O(1n, i, x)} (17)
Next, we construct a so-called adversarial oracle O. This just means defining the family of sets
{Fn}n∈N, in such a way that every non-deterministic Turing machine using the oracle O fails to
decide correctly coSimon(O). The proof will use a diagonalisation argument.
Since the set of non-deterministic Turing machines is countable we consider the k’th machine,
Mk, and check its behaviour when n = k + n0, for some n0 ≥ 0 which we define later on. Suppose
we take some index i ∈ {0, 1}n, and tentatively make the i’th function in Fk a 1-to-1 function. By
simulating the behaviour of Mk on this input we can check to see whether it accepts or rejects. If
it rejects, then we are done, since Mk will incorrectly decide this input. Conversely, if Mk accepts,
then by definition there exists a polynomial-sized path, in the non-deterministic computation tree
of the machine, which leads to acceptance. We denote this path as pi, and denote the length of
pi as l = poly(n). Mk can make at most l queries to O on this path which we can represent as a
list of tuples: [(x1, fi(x1)), (x2, fi(x2))...(xl, fi(xl))], where x1, ...xl are the queried variables. An
example of such a path is shown in Figure 2.
We now simply consider a Simon function f ′ that matched fi on the queried values, i.e. f ′(x1) =
fi(x1), ...f
′(xl) = fi(xl). How do we know such a function exists? The number of possible bit masks
s such that f(x) = f(x⊕s) is 2n−1 (since 0n is excluded). By having f ′ match fi on the l queried
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Figure 2: Computation tree with queries
values it must be that f ′ produces different outputs for each of these values. Therefore for any
i, j ≤ l, i 6= j it must be that s 6= xi⊕xj . This means that there are l(l−1)/2 values of s which are
restricted. But l = poly(n) and since s can take on 2n − 1 possible values, if n is sufficiently large
so that 2n − 1 > l(l − 1)/2, then we can simply choose an s which is not restricted. We therefore
pick n0 to be large enough so that 2
n − 1 > l(l − 1)/2 and then take s to be some mask from the
available 2n − 1 − l(l − 1)/2. We thus have a Simon function which produces the same responses
to the queries on path pi as the 1-to-1 function fi. If we now just take fi to be f
′, then pi will still
be an accepting path and therefore Mk will decide incorrectly on the input 〈1n, i〉.
Through this construction, all non-deterministic Turing machines will have some input on which
they decide coSimon(O) incorrectly, thus coSimon(O) 6∈ NPO concluding the proof.
Lemma 3. There exists an oracle O, based on the complement of Simon’s problem, such that
BQPO 6⊆ MAO.
Proof. The arguments from Lemma 2 can be used to show that even if the deciding machine receives
a polynomial amount of randomness, it still cannot correctly input (with high probability). This
corresponds to showing that the complement of Simon’s problem also lies outside of MA, relative
to the oracle.
The idea for this case will be to pick the oracle at random and then reduce the problem to the
case without randomness. Suppose the oracle is a 1-to-1 function or a Simon function with equal
probability (in either case, the specific function that is picked is chosen uniformly at random). An
MA algorithm is essentially a probability distribution over NP algorithms. If the complement of
Simon’s problem, with respect to the random oracle, is in MA, then there must be an NP machine
that decides the problem correctly with probability at least 2/3, over the random choice of the
oracle.
We have therefore reduced the task of showing that the problem is not in MA to that of showing
that it is not in NP. Consider a non-deterministic Turing machine that accepts a particular input (of
the form described in Equation 15) of length 2n. If the machine accepts this input that means that
there exists an accepting non-deterministic path, making l queries, where l = poly(n). Assuming
the function is a Simon function, from the proof of Lemma 2, it’s clear that the probability of
finding a collision after l queries , (and thus distinguishing the function from a 1-to-1 function),
assuming one has not been found after l − 1 queries, is:
l − 1
2n − 1− l(l − 1)/2 (18)
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But since l = poly(n), this probability is exponentially small in n. Since, for any given input, there
is an equal chance of it being a 1-to-1 function or a Simon function, it follows that the probability
that the algorithm accepts correctly is at most 1/2 + 2−Ω(n), which will be smaller than 2/3, for
sufficiently large n.
Next, we prove:
Lemma 4. For each d ∈ N, there exists an oracle O, such that BQPO 6⊂ (P/O(nd))O.
Proof. To begin with, the class P/O(nd) is the class of problems solved by a deterministic
polynomial-time Turing machine M , which receives an advice of length O(nd), when the input
is of size O(n) (in our case the input size is 2n since we defined n as being the length of inputs to
the 1-to-1 and Simon functions).
In contrast to the previous case, instead of having the ability to non-deterministically choose
one of exponentially many paths, a polynomial-time Turing machine M receives some non-uniform
information to help it in deciding coSimon(O). Each advice determines a new behaviour for M
which can even involve a different sequence of queries to the oracle. What we want to show is that
irrespective of what advice M might receive, it still cannot always correctly decide coSimon(O). To
do this, we consider functions over a larger domain than just n-bit strings. In other words, for each
d we choose D > d such that the set Fn contains 2n functions of the form f : {0, 1}nD → {0, 1}nD .
The oracle, which we now denote as Od, still receives queries of the form (1
n, i, x), where |i| = n,
but now |x| = nD.
First we need to argue that the problem can still be decided in BQPOd . This is indeed the case,
since expanding the domains of the functions simply changes the running time of the quantum
algorithm from O(n) to O(nD). But since D is just a fixed constant, the algorithm still runs in
polynomial time, hence coSimon(Od) ∈ BQPOd .
The harder part is showing coSimon(Od) 6∈ P/O(nd). As before, we will prove this by diagonal-
isation by considering the set of all (deterministic) Turing machines and showing that no matter
which advice the k’th machine receives it cannot correctly decide coSimon(Od). Care must be
taken, as each advice induces a different behaviour and one must consider the oracle so that all
possible advice strings lead to failure. This is in contrast with the previous case where we were
only interested in the behaviour of one accepting path of the non-deterministic computation tree.
Suppose we take the k’th deterministic polynomial-time Turing machine, Mk, and examine
what happens for an input of length n = k + n0, where n0 will be chosen later (as before). Since
the advice is a binary string of length O(nd) there are 2O(n
d) possible advice strings. Whichever
one Mk uses it will be the same for all 2
n inputs of length n.
Let us now consider the first index of length n, namely 0n and assign a 1-to-1 function f :
{0, 1}nD → {0, 1}nD to this index. We can inspect the behaviour of Mk for f and for each possible
advice string. If for more than half of the advice strings Mk rejects, then we keep f at index 0
n.
This means that half of all advice strings have been eliminated (there is at least one input on which
those strings lead to Mk deciding incorrectly). If, however more than half of all advice strings make
Mk accept f , we will attempt to turn f into a Simon function while keeping acceptance for those
advice strings. This will again lead to the elimination of (at least) half of all advice strings.
For each advice aj , where 1 ≤ j ≤ 2O(nd), Mk will make a sequence of polynomially many
queries to f . Denote that sequence of queries together with the responses as:
σj = [(x1j , f(x1j)); (x2j , f(x2j)); ...(xlj , f(xlj))]
where l = poly(n). We now consider a Simon function f ′ : {0, 1}nD → {0, 1}nD such that for all j
in which Mk with advice aj and queries σj accepts and for all t ≤ l, we have that f ′(xtj) = f(xtj).
In other words f ′ will give identical responses to the queries which make Mk accept. Since t ranges
from 1 to l = poly(n) and j ranges from 1 to 2O(n
d), the maximum number of variables which are
queried is of order 2O(n
d). But unlike in the previous lemma, this number is exponential in the
size of the input, so how can we be sure that such a Simon function even exists? The trick is that
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we can choose the domain size through D and make it large enough to accommodate for a Simon
function with this property.
As before, because f is bijective, no two queried variables will produce the same answer.
Therefore, there cannot be a bit mask s (|s| = nD) relating any pair of the 2O(nd) queries. These
will be the restricted values of s. The total number of such values is also of order 2O(n
d), however
the total number of possible values is 2O(n
D). Thus, if we simply choose D such that 2O(n
D) > 2O(n
d)
then we can find a Simon function f ′ which matches the responses of f on the 2O(nd) queries.
Hence, for this case if we use f ′ as the function for index 0n we will eliminate half of the possible
advice strings. Thus, no matter how Mk behaves we are able to eliminate half of all possible advice
strings with our first input of length 2n. Clearly this process can be repeated for the next index
and so on until the last index. We are effectively halving the number of potentially useful advice
strings with each index. Since we are doing this 2n times, to eliminate all possible advice strings
we just need to ensure that 2O(n
d)/22
n
< 1 or 2O(n
d) < 22
n
. To achieve this, simply choose n0
(recall that n = k + n0) large enough so that the inequality holds.
We therefore have that for all k, and for all possible advice strings, there will always be an
input to coSimon(Od) which is decided incorrectly, hence coSimon(Od) 6∈ P/O(nd).
Note that the same proof would not work for P/poly. A crucial element in our proof was the
fact that we can make D (which determines the size of the domain of each function) to be much
larger than d (which determines the length of the advice). But this is only possible because d is
fixed from the very beginning. If the advice length could be any arbitrary polynomial then no
matter what constant value of D we decided upon for our oracle, there would always be some
d > D and hence some polynomial length of the advice string for which the proof does not work.
A possible “fix” would be to make D part of the input in some form, so that it too can increase.
So if, say, D was included in the input as a g(n) unary string, where g is some monotonically
increasing function, then for sufficiently large n, g(n) > d. But we immediately notice the problem
with this approach. While it is true that in this case the problem cannot be decided in P/polyO
it would also no longer be decidable in BQPO either. This is because the query complexity of
the quantum algorithm becomes O(ng(n)) which is no longer polynomial unless g is the constant
function. Hence, proving separation from P/poly seems to require some non-trivial modification of
this proof or a totally different technique.
Finally, we can prove Theorem 1 by combining the previous results.
Proof of Theorem 1. Let us first show that, relative to an oracle, the complement of Simon’s prob-
lem is not contained in NP/O(nd). The oracle Od will be defined in the exact same way as for the
P/O(nd) case. The same reasoning as before applies here. Take the k’th non-deterministic Turing
machine and examine its behaviour for some input 〈1n, i〉, where n = k + n0 and n0 is chosen
as before. For each index, we tentatively pick a 1-to-1 function and examine what the machine
does for each advice of length O(nd). If more than half of the advice strings lead to rejection
then we keep the bijective function and proceed to the next index. Otherwise we replace it with
a Simon function. In this case, for each advice in which the machine accepts, there will be some
polynomial-sized path leading to acceptance. We will pick one accepting path for each advice on
which the machine accepts and ensure that the Simon function produces the same responses to
the queries on those paths. This reduces the problem to the previous case. We know that for
sufficiently large D such a function exists and therefore each index will render half of the possible
advice strings useless. By also choosing n0 large enough we can make sure that all advice strings
are eliminated and thus that the problem is incorrectly decided by all non-deterministic Turing
machines irrespective of the advice (of length O(nd)).
For the MA/O(nd) case, one can use the same proof as in Lemma 3 to reduce to the NP/O(nd)
case. It follows that coSimon(Od) 6∈ MA/O(nd).
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4 GES for exact BosonSampling and circuits for the permanent
To prove Theorem 2, we first need to show a number of results concerning permanents of matrices.
The purpose of these results is to eventually show that having an oracle for estimating the squared
permanent of a matrix taking values in {−1, 0, 1}, yields a polynomial-time algorithm, with random
access to nO(n) bits of advice, for exactly computing the permanent. This result together with the
assumption that a GES allows the client to sample exactly from the BosonSampling distribution
and a result of Bjo¨rklund, from [37], will allow us to prove Theorem 2.
Let us first introduce some helpful notation: for a matrix, A, we will denote Ai,j as the matrix
obtained by deleting row i and column j from A.
Lemma 5. Let X = (xi,j) ∈ {−1, 0, 1}n×n. There exists a matrix Z = (zi,j) ∈ {−1, 0, 1}(n+2)×(n+2)
such that:
• zn+2,n+2 = 0
• Per(Z) = −Per(X)
• Per(Zn+2,n+2) = Per(X1,1)
Proof. Let Z be the following matrix:
Z =

xn,n xn,n−1 . . . xn,1 0 0
xn−1,n xn−1,n−1 . . . xn−1,1 0 0
...
...
...
...
...
x1,n x1,n−1 . . . x1,1 1 −1
0 0 . . . 1 0 1
0 0 . . . −1 −1 0

We can see that zn+2,n+2 = 0. It is also not difficult to see that Per(Z
n+2,n+2) = Per(X1,1),
through a Laplace expansion. We now perform a Laplace expansion along the last row of Z, to
compute its permanent:
Per(Z) = −(Per(Zn+2,n+1) + Per(Zn+2,n)) (19)
But Per(Zn+2,n) = Per(X1,1) and Per(Zn+2,n+1) = Per(X) − Per(X1,1) hence Per(Z) =
−Per(X).
Lemma 6. Let X = (xij) ∈ {−1, 0, 1}n×n, Z = (zij) ∈ {−1, 0, 1}m×m, m ≥ 2, such that zm,m = 0
and W = (wij) ∈ {−1, 0, 1}(m+n−1)×(m+n−1) defined as follows:
W =

z1,1 z1,2 . . . z1,m 0 . . . 0
z2,1 z2,2 . . . z2,m 0 . . . 0
...
...
...
...
...
zm−1,1 zm−1,2 . . . zm−1,m 0 . . . 0
zm,1 zm,2 . . . x1,1 x1,2 . . . x1,n
0 0 . . . x2,1 x2,2 . . . x2,n
...
...
...
...
...
0 0 . . . xn,1 xn,2 . . . xn,n

Then, it is the case that:
Per(W ) = Per(Z)Per(X1,1) + Per(Zm,m)Per(X) (20)
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Proof. We will prove this by induction over m. For the m = 2 case we have:
W =

z1,1 z1,2 0 . . . 0
z2,1 x1,1 x1,2 . . . x1,n
0 x2,1 x2,2 . . . x2,n
...
...
...
...
0 xn,1 xn,2 . . . xn,n

By doing a Laplace expansion along the first row of W , we get:
Per(W ) = z1,1Per(X) + z1,2z2,1Per(X
1,1) (21)
Now note that:
Z =
[
z1,1 z1,2
z2,1 0
]
So Per(Z) = z1,2z2,1 and Per(Z
2,2) = z1,1, therefore:
Per(W ) = Per(Z)Per(X1,1) + Per(Z2,2)Per(X) (22)
We now assume the relation is true for m− 1 and prove it for m. To do this, we will first Laplace
expand the permanent of W along the first row:
Per(W ) =
m−1∑
i=1
z1,iPer(W
1,i) + z1,mPer(W
1,m) (23)
The reason for separating the terms this way, is because W 1,i, with i < m, is of the same form as
W and we can therefore apply the induction hypothesis. Doing so yields:
Per(W ) =
m−1∑
i=1
z1,i(Per(Z
1,i)Per(X1,1) + Per(Z(1,m),(i,m))Per(X)) + z1,mPer(W
1,m) (24)
Where Z(1,m),(i,m) is obtained from Z by deleting rows 1 and m and columns i and m. Taking
common factors we get:
Per(W ) = Per(X1,1)
m−1∑
i=1
z1,iPer(Z
1,i) +Per(X)
m−1∑
i=1
z1,iPer(Z
(1,m),(i,m)) + z1,mPer(W
1,m) (25)
But notice that:
m−1∑
i=1
z1,iPer(Z
(1,m),(i,m)) = Per(Zm,m) (26)
since it is a Laplace expansion along the first row of Zm,m. This leads to:
Per(W ) = Per(X1,1)
m−1∑
i=1
z1,iPer(Z
1,i) + Per(X)Per(Zm,m) + z1,mPer(W
1,m) (27)
The matrix W 1,m is of the same form as W :
W 1,m =

z2,1 z2,2 . . . z2,m−1 0 . . . 0
...
...
...
...
...
zm−1,1 zm−1,2 . . . zm−1,m−1 0 . . . 0
zm,1 zm,2 . . . zm,m−1 x1,2 . . . x1,n
0 0 . . . 0 x2,2 . . . x2,n
...
...
...
...
...
0 0 . . . 0 xn,2 . . . xn,n

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We can see this by taking:
ZW 1,m =

z2,1 z2,2 . . . z2,m−1
...
...
...
zm−1,1 zm−1,2 . . . zm−1,m−1
zm,1 zm,2 . . . 0
 XW 1,m =

zm,m−1 x1,2 . . . x1,n
0 x2,2 . . . x2,n
...
...
...
0 xn,2 . . . xn,n

Together with the induction hypothesis this gives us:
Per(W 1,m) = Per(ZW 1,m)Per(X
1,1
W 1,m
) + Per(Zm−1,m−1
W 1,m
)Per(XW 1,m) (28)
Now note that Per(XW 1,m) = zm,m−1Per(X
1,1
W 1,m
) and Per(X1,1
W 1,m
) = Per(X1,1), hence:
Per(W 1,m) = Per(X1,1)(Per(ZW 1,m) + zm,m−1Per(Z
m−1,m−1
W 1,m
) (29)
But the term in parenthesis is Per(Z1,m) so:
Per(W 1,m) = Per(X1,1)Per(Z1,m) (30)
By substituting this into Equation 27, we get:
Per(W ) = Per(X1,1)
m−1∑
i=1
z1,iPer(Z
1,i) + Per(X)Per(Zm,m) + z1,mPer(X
1,1)Per(Z1,m) (31)
After grouping terms:
Per(W ) = Per(X1,1)
m∑
i=1
z1,iPer(Z
1,i) + Per(X)Per(Zm,m) (32)
But:
m∑
i=1
z1,iPer(Z
1,i) = Per(Z) (33)
Thus:
Per(W ) = Per(Z)Per(X1,1) + Per(Zm,m)Per(X) (34)
This concludes the proof.
Using the above lemmas, we can now show the following:
Theorem 8. Let O be an oracle that, given a matrix X ∈ {−1, 0, 1}n×n, outputs a number O(X)
such that:
Per(X)2
g
≤ O(X) ≤ gPer(X)2 (35)
where g ∈ [1, poly(n)]. Then, for any X ∈ {−1, 0, 1}n×n there exists a polynomial time algorithm
for computing Per(X), which has random access to nO(n) bits of advice and making poly(n) queries
to O.
Proof. The theorem shows that having an oracle for computing a multiplicative approximation for
the squared permanent of a matrix, implies the existence of a polynomial time algorithm, with
nO(n) bits of advice, that can compute the permanent exactly.
The proof of this theorem is inspired from a similar result of Aaronson and Arkhipov (see
Theorem 4.3 from [35]). In that case, the oracle was outputting a multiplicative approximation
of the squared permanent of an arbitrary real matrix. In our case, however, the matrices are
restricted to entries from {−1, 0, 1}, which means that we cannot directly use that result.
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We prove the theorem by induction. For the case of n = 1 the algorithm simply outputs X.
Suppose now that we have an algorithm for computing the permanents of (n−1)×(n−1) matrices
with entries from {−1, 0, 1}. We will use this algorithm to compute the permanent of X. Firstly,
if O(X) = 0, then Per(X) = 0 and we are done. Additionally, we are going to use the oracle
to check if any of the (n − 1) × (n − 1) minors of X are non-zero. If all of them are zero, then
Per(X) = 0 again and we are done. So let’s assume that Per(X) 6= 0 and Per(X1,1) 6= 016.
We know from Lemma 6, that if we take a matrix Z = (zij) ∈ {−1, 0, 1}m×m, m ≥ 2, such that
zm,m = 0 and then construct:
W =

z1,1 z1,2 . . . z1,m 0 . . . 0
z2,1 z2,2 . . . z2,m 0 . . . 0
...
...
...
...
...
zm−1,1 zm−1,2 . . . zm−1,m 0 . . . 0
zm,1 zm,2 . . . x1,1 x1,2 . . . x1,n
0 0 . . . x2,1 x2,2 . . . x2,n
...
...
...
...
...
0 0 . . . xn,1 xn,2 . . . xn,n

we have that:
Per(W ) = Per(Zm,m)Per(X) + Per(Z)Per(X1,1) (36)
If Per(W ) = 0 and Per(Zm,m) 6= 0, then:
Per(X) = −Per(X1,1) Per(Z)
Per(Zm,m)
(37)
From Lemma 5, we know that for any n× n matrix X, there exists an (n+ 2)× (n+ 2) matrix Z,
such that zn+2,n+2 = 0, Per(Z) = −Per(X) and Per(Zn+2,n+2) = Per(X1,1). If one used such a
Z in the construction of W , then it is immediate that Per(W ) = 0 and that Per(Zn+2,n+2) 6= 0.
The algorithm will search for such a Z, construct the corresponding W and use the oracle to test
if Per(W ) = 0. If the permanent of W is zero, then one can compute the permanent of X using
Equation 37.
But how do we search for Z and, furthermore, how do we compute Per(Z)/Per(Zn+2,n+2)?
This is where we make use of advice. Note that since Z ∈ {−1, 0, 1}(n+2)×(n+2), we have that:
−(n+ 2)! ≤ Per(Z) ≤ (n+ 2)! (38)
hence, there are at most nO(n) possible values for the permanents of Z matrices. Similarly, there
are at most nO(n) possible values for the permanents of the Zn+2,n+2 minors of Z matrices.
The advice, to our algorithm, will consist of tuples (Zi, P er(Z
n+2,n+2
i ), fi =
Per(Zi)/Per(Z
n+2,n+2
i )), comprising of a matrix Zi together with the permanent of its top left
(n+1)×(n+1) minor and the ratio between that matrix’s permanent and the permanent of its top
left minor, with i ≤ ncn, for some constant c > 0. Here Zi ∈ {−1, 0, 1}(n+2)×(n+2), with the bottom
right entry being 0 and Per(Zn+2,n+2i ) 6= 0. The matrices in the tuples are such that all possible
values for the fraction fi = Per(Zi)/Per(Z
n+2,n+2
i ) are covered. From the above discussion, it’s
clear that there will be at most nO(n) such tuples. Furthermore, the tuples are sorted in ascending
order with respect to those fractions.
For a given matrix X, our algorithm should search through this advice in order to find a matrix
Zi such that O(Wi) = 0, where Wi is constructed from X and Zi as in Lemma 6. When such a
matrix is found, we have that:
Per(X) = −Per(X1,1)fi (39)
16The permanent is invariant under permutations of rows and columns. Thus, if X has a non-zero minor, we can
simply permute the columns of X, so that X1,1 is that minor.
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But fi is given in the advice tuple and Per(X
1,1) is computed recursively by our algorithm, hence
we have computed the permanent of X.
To find the matrix Zi we will perform a binary search over the advice. Suppose that i ranges
from 1 to l = nO(n). Additionally, let αi = Per(Z
n+2,n+2
i ), so that:
Per(Wi) = αi(Per(X) + fiPer(X
1,1)) (40)
This means that computing
√O(Wi)/|αi| gives us a multiplicative approximation for |Per(X) +
fiPer(X
1,1)|. Because the fi values are sorted in ascending order, this means that the function:
h(i) = Per(X) + fiPer(X
1,1) (41)
is monotonically increasing as a function of i and furthermore that there is a unique value i such
that h(i) = 0. In our case, however, we have a multiplicative approximation for |h(i)|, which we
denote as t(i) =
√O(Wi)/|αi|. This function will be monotonically decreasing between 1 and i
and increasing between i and l. We look for i using binary search as follows: compute t(v) and
t(w) for the middle two points, v and w of the interval [1, l]. If either of them is 0, then we are
done. Otherwise, if t(v) < t(w), then search the interval [2, v], otherwise the interval [w, l]. Repeat
this recursively until the minimum is found.
Given that the advice is of length nO(n), the algorithm will query it (and consequently O as
well) at most O(n log n) times. Additionally, the construction of each Wi takes time O(n
2) and
since this is done at most O(n log n) times, the complexity of this step is O(n3 log n). Finally, the
algorithm performs recursive calls to itself (in order to compute Per(X1,1)) and if we add up the
running times of each step we find that the total runtime will be O(n4 log n).
Theorem 9. If a BPP/rpoly algorithm can sample exactly from the BosonSampling distribution
then for any matrix X ∈ {−1, 0, 1}n×n, there exist circuits of size 2n−Ω
(
n
logn
)
, making polynomially-
sized queries to an NP oracle, for computing Per(X).
Proof. The starting point for our proof is a result by Bjo¨rklund [37]. He showed that, for k ≤ n,
the permanent of an n × n matrix, X, can be expressed as a linear combination of poly(n)2n−k
permanents of k× k matrices. It should be noted that these matrices are not necessarily minors of
the original matrix. Nevertheless, each k × k matrix can be computed efficiently given the input
matrix, X.
Our task will be to compute all of these poly(n)2n−k permanents and then perform the linear
combination so as to arrive at the permanent of X. We will use the result of Theorem 8 together
with the fact that there exists a BPP/rpoly algorithm for exact BosonSampling, to show that the
permanent of a k × k matrix can be computed in polynomial time, using random access to kO(k)
bits of advice and polynomially-sized queries to an NP oracle. Crucially, the kO(k)-sized advice will
be the same for all k×k matrices. This means that all permanents can be computed in poly(n)2n−k
time with access to kO(k) bits of advice. The explicit value of k, as a function of n, will be chosen
later.
Consider a k × k matrix, M , and a value  > 0, to be chosen later. We embed M , a scaled
version of M , as a submatrix of a BosonSampling matrix AM . In other words, AM ∈ Cm×k,
with m = poly(k) (see [35] for more details). We then have that the probability of detecting one
photon in each output mode, a state which we denote as |1〉, is:
p = Per(M)2 = 2k · Per(M)2 (42)
Since Per(M) ≤ k!, to ensure that p ≤ 1, it suffices to set  = 1/k.
If a BPP/rpoly machine can simulate the output distribution of a BosonSampling instance,
AM , that means that: ∑
y
qyPr(A(AM , y) outputs |1〉) = p (43)
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where A is a BPP algorithm and y is the rpoly advice string, of size polynomial in k, drawn from the
distribution Dk = {qy}y. Note that Dk only depends on k. If we can estimate p up to multiplicative
error in polynomial time (potentially with the help of an NP oracle and kO(k) bits of advice) then
we will effectively be simulating the oracle O from Theorem 8.
To do this, first note that if Per(M) 6= 0, the smallest possible value of p is 1/kO(k). We will
therefore consider our advice string to consist of kO(k) samples from Dk, along with their associated
probabilities17. Denote the set of these samples as S. This allows us to define:
pest =
∑
y∈S
qyPr(A(AM , y) outputs |1〉) (44)
as a multiplicative estimate for p. But A is a BPP algorithm, which means that we can view it as a
polynomial-time function, fA(AM , y, r) which receives as input (apart from AM and y) a random
string r ∈ {0, 1}l(k), for some polynomial l. The function will output either 1, corresponding to the
cases where A outputs |1〉, or 0, corresponding to the cases where A produces some other output.
We therefore have that:
Pr(A(AM , y) outputs |1〉) = 1
2l(k)
∑
r∈{0,1}l(k)
fA(AM , y, r) (45)
and this leads to our estimate of p being:
pest =
1
2l(k)
∑
y∈S
∑
r∈{0,1}l(k)
qyfA(AM , y, r) (46)
Computing pest exactly would require summing exponentially many terms. However notice
that pest is a sum of exponentially many positive numbers, each of which can be evaluated in
polynomial time (given access to the kO(k) advice). For this reason, we can use Stockmeyer’s
approximate counting method to compute a multiplicative estimate of pest [59]. This will, of
course, also yield a multiplicative estimate for p itself.
We have thus given an algorithm for computing a multiplicative estimate of a k× k matrix M
that works in time polynomial in k, performs queries to an NP oracle and has random access to
kO(k) bits of advice. This algorithm can now be viewed as an implementation of the oracle O from
Theorem 8. Using that theorem, leads to a polynomial-time algorithm, with access to an NP oracle
and kO(k)-size advice, for computing Per(M) exactly. However, since the advice is the same for all
k × k matrices, by repeating this procedure for all poly(n)2n−k k × k matrices and combining the
results we obtain an algorithm for computing Per(X) that runs in time poly(n)2n−k, uses kO(k)
bits of advice and makes polynomially-sized queries to an NP oracle.
The last step is to convert this algorithm into a circuit. Since the algorithm has a running time
of poly(n)2n−k, by choosing k = c n/ log n, for some suitable constant c > 0, we will have circuits
of size at most 2
n−Ω
(
n
log(n)
)
. These circuits, must also operate on the kO(k) bits of advice. Note
that kO(k)  2n−Ω
(
n
log(n)
)
. To reproduce the random access to these bits, we will assume that the
gates have unbounded fan-in. The advice bits are therefore hardcoded into the circuit and “fed”
into each part of the algorithm that makes use of them. Since only polynomially-many bits of the
advice are used at any given point, this can only increase the size of our circuit by a polynomial
factor. This concludes the proof.
With the above result, the proof of Theorem 2 is immediate:
Proof of Theorem 2. Recall from the end of Section 2.3 that the existence of a GES for sampling
from a distribution, Dx, implies the existence of a probabilistic polynomial-time algorithm, with
17The fact that the advice has size kO(k) will ensure that, if p is non-zero, then a y such that
Pr(A(AM , y) outputs |1〉) > 0 is overwhelmingly likely to be sampled when we generate the advice.
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an NP oracle, and which receives randomised polynomial-sized advice, for sampling from Dx. In
other words, having a GES for BosonSampling means having a BPPNP/rpoly algorithm that can
sample from the exact BosonSampling distribution. We now notice that the result of Theorem 9
relativises. In particular, this means that if a BPPNP/rpoly algorithm can sample from the exact
BosonSampling distribution, then for any matrix X ∈ {−1, 0, 1}n×n, there exist circuits of size
2
n−Ω
(
n
logn
)
, making polynomially-sized queries to an NPNP oracle, for computing Per(X).
5 Quantum GES
5.1 An upper bound for QGES functions
This section is, in a certain sense, dedicated to ‘quantising’ the Abadi et al. result. First of all, we
need to define the quantum generalised encryption scheme. Since we’re defining this in analogy
to UBQC and other blind quantum computing protocols, our QGES considers a single quantum
message from the client to the server, rather than allowing the entire interaction between client
and server to be quantum. More formally, we have the following:
Definition 4 (Quantum Generalised Encryption Scheme (QGES)). A quantum generalised en-
cryption scheme (QGES) is a two party protocol between a quantum polynomial-time client C, and
an unbounded server S, characterised by:
• A function f : {0, 1}∗ → {0, 1}.
• A cleartext input x ∈ {0, 1}∗, for which the client wants to compute f(x).
• An expected polynomial-time key generation algorithm K which works as follows: for any x ∈
{0, 1}∗, with probability greater than 1/2 + 1/poly(|x|) we have (k, success) ← K(x), where
k ∈ {0, 1}poly(|x|). If the algorithm does not return success then we have (k′, fail) ← K(x),
where k′ ∈ {0, 1}poly(|x|).
• A quantum polynomial-time algorithm QE, that takes as input classical bit strings and pro-
duces as output a quantum state, which works as follows: for any x ∈ {0, 1}∗, k ∈ {0, 1}poly(|x|)
we have that |y〉 ← QE(x, k), where |y〉 ∈ H and dim(H) = 2poly(|x|).
• A polynomial-time deterministic algorithm E which works as follows: for any x ∈ {0, 1}∗,
k ∈ {0, 1}poly(|x|) and s ∈ {0, 1}poly(|x|) we have that w ← E(x, k, s), where w ∈ {0, 1}poly(|x|).
• A polynomial-time deterministic decryption algorithm D, which works as follows: for any
x ∈ {0, 1}∗, k ∈ {0, 1}poly(|x|) and s ∈ {0, 1}poly(|x|) we have that z ← D(s, k, x), where
z ∈ {0, 1}poly(|x|).
And satisfying the following properties:
1. There are m rounds of communication, such that m = poly(|x|). Denote the client’s message
in round i as ci and the server’s message as si.
2. On cleartext input x, C runs the key generation algorithm until success to compute a key
(k, success) = K(x). This happens before the communication between C and S is initiated,
and the key k is used throughout the protocol. C then runs QE(x, k) to obtain a quantum
encryption of the input, |y〉 and sends it to S18.
3. In round i of the protocol, C computes ci = E(x, k, si−1), where si−1 denotes the server’s
responses up to and including round i−1, i.e. 〈s0, s1...si−1〉. We assume that s0 is the empty
string. C then sends ci to S.
18It should be noted that it makes no difference for our definition if the client sends the whole state |y〉 to the
server or part of it. The state received by the server will be mixed and the only important property we require is
that the client has a purification of this state.
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4. In round i of the protocol, S responds with si, such that si ∈ {0, 1}poly(|x|).
5. At the end of the protocol, C computes z ← D(sm, k, x) and with probability 1/2+1/poly(|x|),
it must be that z = f(x).
As mentioned in the introduction, we add an additional requirement to our QGES known as
offline-ness. What this means is that the client can send a quantum state to the server, representing
an encryption of the input, and decide afterwards which input it intends to use. Essentially the
client is free to change its mind about the input and not commit to a particular input when the
protocol commences. More formally, we define the offline condition as follows:
Definition 5 (Offline QGES). In a QGES, let:
|ψx〉 = 1√|KC(x)|
∑
kxi ∈KC(x)
|kxi 〉K |yxi 〉E (47)
be the state of the client’s system on input x in a superposition over possible keys and encryptions.
Here, KC(x) is the set of encryption keys which are compatible with x (i.e. could have resulted from
the key generation algorithm acting on x, K(x)) and |yxi 〉E ← QE(x, kxi ) is the quantum encryption
of x using the key kxi . The subscripts K and E indicate the key register and the encrypted input
register, respectively.
For n > 0, let x1, x2 ∈ {0, 1}n be two different inputs for f such that x1 6= x2. We say that
the QGES is offline if there exists a polynomial-sized quantum circuit, V , acting only on the key
register, K, such that V |ψx1〉 = |ψx1〉.
The definition essentially says that there exists an efficient procedure that the client can apply
on her local system in order to map from one input of size n, to a different input of the same
size. One might ask whether this property is not immediately satisfied by a QGES leaking only
the size of the input. Indeed, leaking only the size of the input is equivalent to saying that the
density matrix corresponding to the quantum encryption, which the server receives, is the same
for all inputs of the same size. In other words, it is the case that:
TrK(|ψx1〉 〈ψx1 |) = TrK(|ψx2〉 〈ψx2 |) (48)
for any x1, x2 ∈ {0, 1}n. Since the density matrix is the same, that means that there exists a
unitary (acting on the client’s system) which can map one purification of this state, corresponding
to one input, to another, corresponding to a different input. This unitary must be verifiable in
the sense that the client can check (using a quantum SWAP test) whether the unitary maps to
the correct purification. However, this unitary need not have a polynomial-sized quantum circuit
representation. The offline condition simply imposes that such a circuit always exists. As we’ve
mentioned before, UBQC and all other existing delegated blind quantum computation protocols
satisfy this property.
We are now ready to prove Theorem 3, showing that functions that can be delegated by the
client to the server in an offline QGES are contained in QCMA/qpoly ∩ coQCMA/qpoly:
Proof of Theorem 3. For an input x for which the client wants to compute f(x), consider the state:
|ψx〉 = 1√|KC(x)|
∑
kxi ∈KC(x)
|kxi 〉K |yxi 〉E (49)
where the notation is the same as in Definition 5. If we trace out the key register, K, the resulting
density matrix is the mixed state of possible encrypted states which the server will receive:
ρx =
1
|KC(x)|
∑
kxi ∈KC(x)
|yxi 〉 〈yxi | (50)
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The assumption that the protocol only leaks the size of the input x to the server implies that for
any two inputs x1, x2 it is the case that ρx1 = ρx2 . In fact, something stronger is true. The server’s
‘view’ of the protocol should be the same in both cases. By this we mean that the server’s system
as well as the distribution of his classical messages must be independent of x, given the size of x.
Therefore, we should consider a state comprising of his system and his response after receiving the
quantum encryption, for a particular input, x:
|φx〉 = 1√|KC(x)|
∑
kxi ∈KC(x)
|kxi 〉K UERS |yxi 〉E |0〉⊗tR |anc〉S (51)
Here, UERS is the unitary performed by the server in order to produce his response, which will
be stored in the response register, initially set to |0〉⊗tR , where t = poly(|x|). This unitary will of
course involve the encrypted state provided by the client and the server’s private ancilla, denoted
as |anc〉S (but will not involve the key register). Note that the server’s response is a classical bit
string. Hence, the state in the response register, obtained through the application of the unitary
UERS , will be a probabilistic mixture over computational basis states. This, however, makes no
difference in our proof and we can just as well assume that his response is a general quantum state.
If we again trace out the register K we obtain some state σx = TrK(|φx〉 〈φx|). This state
encodes the distribution of possible messages exchanged by the client and the server in one round
of interaction, as well as the server’s private system. Since ρx1 = ρx2 , it is also the case that
σx1 = σx2 . By the purification principle, this means that if we consider the states:
|φx1〉 =
1√|KC(x1)|
∑
k
x1
i ∈KC(x1)
|kx1i 〉K UERS |yx1i 〉E |0〉⊗tR |anc〉S (52)
|φx2〉 =
1√|KC(x2)|
∑
k
x2
i ∈KC(x2)
|kx2i 〉K UERS |yx2i 〉E |0〉⊗tR |anc〉S (53)
there exists a local unitary, VK , acting only on the key register which can map |φx1〉 to |φx2〉, for
any two inputs x1 and x2. In fact, let us examine the states of the system for inputs x1 and x2
before UERS is applied:
|χx1〉 =
1√|KC(x1)|
∑
k
x1
i ∈KC(x1)
|kx1i 〉K |yx1i 〉E |0〉⊗tR |anc〉S = |ψx1〉KE |0〉⊗tR |anc〉S (54)
|χx2〉 =
1√|KC(x2)|
∑
k
x2
i ∈KC(x2)
|kx2i 〉K |yx2i 〉E |0〉⊗tR |anc〉S = |ψx2〉KE |0〉⊗tR |anc〉S (55)
These states are also related by VK . This can be inferred from the following relations. First, we
know that:
(VK ⊗ IERS) |φx1〉 = |φx2〉 (56)
And also that:
(IK ⊗ UERS) |χx1〉 = |φx1〉 (IK ⊗ UERS) |χx2〉 = |φx2〉 (57)
Therefore:
(IK ⊗ U †ERS)(VK ⊗ IERS)(IK ⊗ UERS) |χx1〉 = |χx2〉 (58)
But (IK ⊗ U †ERS) and VK ⊗ IERS commute because they act on different systems and therefore
(IK ⊗ U †ERS) and (IK ⊗ UERS) will cancel out, leaving:
(VK ⊗ IERS) |χx1〉 = |χx2〉 (59)
This is also illustrated in the following diagram:
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|χx1〉
VK⊗IERS //
IK⊗UERS

|χx2〉
|φx1〉
VK⊗IERS // |φx2〉
IK⊗U†ERS
OO
Since the protocol is offline, we know that VK must be a polynomial-sized quantum circuit. Note
that even if we trace out the server’s ancilla from the states |φx1〉 and |φx2〉, the resulting states
are still related by VK on the key register. This allows us to define a QCMA/qpoly algorithm
computing any function which admits a QGES. To do so we first introduce some notation. We will
consider the following states:
|κx〉 = 1√|KC(x)|
∑
kxi ∈KC(x)
|kxi 〉K (60)
|κx′〉 = 1√|KC(x′)|
∑
kx
′
i ∈KC(x′)
∣∣∣kx′i 〉
K
(61)
which are simply superpositions over the valid keys for two different inputs x and x′. Next we
consider:
|φx〉 = 1√|KC(x)|
∑
kxi ∈KC(x)
|kxi 〉K UERS |yxi 〉E |0〉⊗tR |anc〉S (62)
|φx′〉 = 1√|KC(x′)|
∑
kx
′
i ∈KC(x′)
∣∣∣kx′i 〉
K
UERS
∣∣∣yx′i 〉
E
|0〉⊗tR |anc〉S (63)
which include the encrypted states and the server’s response. Lastly, we trace out the server’s
ancilla from both these states resulting in:
ωx = TrS(|φx〉 〈φx|) (64)
ωx′ = TrS(|φx′〉 〈φx′ |) (65)
From the above argument the two states |κx〉 and |κx′〉 and the two states ωx and ωx′ are related
through the same polynomial-sized quantum circuit VK acting only on the key register.
We can now present the algorithm. Let us first consider the one round case. The algorithm
would work as follows:
1. The input to the algorithm is some string x for which we want to compute f(x).
2. The algorithm receives as advice the string x′ which is simply some string of the same length
as x. Additionally, it receives the state ωx′ . It is clear that both of these only depend on |x|
and have a length which is polynomial in |x| hence constituting a valid advice.
3. From the definition of the key generating function, the algorithm can efficiently produce the
states |κx〉 and |κx′〉.
4. The classical witness is a description of the quantum circuit V †K .
5. The algorithm tests that V †K maps |κx′〉 to |κx〉. This can be done through a quantum SWAP
test.
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6. Use V †K to map ωx′ to ωx.
7. By measuring the response register of ωx, the algorithm obtains the response that the server
would have produced in an interaction with the client in the QGES protocol. Applying the
decryption algorithm to this response will yield the correct result f(x) with high probability.
The probability of success of the algorithm can be boosted by providing polynomially many copies
of ωx′ as advice and performing multiple SWAP tests. Additionally this algorithm can be made to
compute the complement of f(x) as well which would gives us a coQCMA/qpoly containment.
Let us now consider the case of polynomially many rounds of interaction, of which the first
round involves quantum interaction. We’ve shown that for that first round, we can design a
polynomial-time quantum algorithm, receiving quantum advice and a classical witness, to emulate
the client in the QGES. For the rounds after the quantum interaction, we essentially have a
classical GES. Our algorithm would then operate as in the proof of Theorem 7. In other words,
apart from the quantum advice and the witness providing the circuit VK , the algorithm will
also receive classical (randomised) advice corresponding to a transcript of the classical interaction
in the protocol, and a key k to decrypt this transcript. It follows that f will be contained in
QCMA/qpoly ∩ coQCMA/qpoly.
A question we might ask is: why can’t we adapt this proof to the case of full quantum com-
munication between the client and the server? For this case, we would need a stronger version
of the offline-ness condition that imposes the existence of a polynomial-size quantum circuit for
mapping the entire transcript of the protocol, corresponding to some input x1 to that of some
input x2 (where |x1| = |x2|). Another question is whether the class of interest should in fact
be BQPQCMA/qpoly∩coQCMA/qpoly since a BQP client could use the QGES as an oracle. Just as we
showed that BPPNP/poly∩coNP/poly = NP/poly ∩ coNP/poly we can show that:
Lemma 7. BQPQCMA/qpoly∩coQCMA/qpoly = QCMA/qpoly ∩ coQCMA/qpoly
Proof. This proof is similar to the one showing that BPPNP/poly∩coNP/poly = NP/poly ∩ coNP/poly.
Just like in that case, the inclusion QCMA/qpoly ∩ coQCMA/qpoly ⊆ BQPQCMA/qpoly∩coQCMA/qpoly
is immediate and we need only show that BQPQCMA/qpoly∩coQCMA/qpoly ⊆ QCMA/qpoly. The con-
tainment in coQCMA/qpoly follows by complementation.
Consider a quantum algorithm QA for deciding problems in BQPQCMA/qpoly∩coQCMA/qpoly. We
will show that this algorithm can be simulated by a QCMA/qpoly algorithm, denoted NQA. Since
BQP, QCMA and coQCMA have bounded error in deciding problems, we can assume, from standard
amplification techniques, that this error is of order 2−poly(n), where n is the size of the input. We
will also assume that for all quantum algorithms measurements are postponed until the end of the
circuit.
We will treat the case without advice first, and then explain how to deal with the quantum
advice at the end. To start with, NQA will simulate QA until it makes a query to the oracle.
In the standard definition of oracles the oracle is just a classical function that solves a decision
problem. However, when dealing with quantum algorithms such as QA it is also possible to speak of
quantum oracles, where the oracle can be viewed as some unitary operation (technically a sequence
of unitary operations for each possible input length, see [65] for more details) which QA can query
even in superposition. Our result will cover this more general case of quantum oracles. We would
therefore like the NQA algorithm to be able to simulate this quantum oracle.
Firstly, just like in the classical case we have that if some language L ∈ QCMA∩ coQCMA then
L ∈ QCMA and Lc ∈ coQCMA, where Lc is the complement of L. This means that there exist
polynomial-sized quantum circuits QL and QLc which take some input x along with classical wit-
nesses w1 and w2, respectively, and decide correctly, when the output is measured, with probability
at least, 1−2−poly(|x|). In other words, QL receives as input |x〉 |w1〉 |0m〉 and QLc receives as input
|x〉 |w2〉 |0m〉, respectively, where m = poly(|x|). If we were to run both QL and QLc on x, because
L and Lc are complementary, the output qubits, when measured, will also be complementary with
high probability.
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Assume that QL and QLc are circuits which act on t = poly(|x|) qubits. We define a new
quantum circuit called SimQuery which operates on 2t+ 1 qubits. SimQuery applies QL to the
first t qubits and QLc to the next t qubits. It then applies a Pauli X to the output qubit of QLc
and a CCNOT operation from the output qubits of QL and QLc onto the the 2t + 1’th qubit. It
then applies X again to the output qubit of QLc and then Q
†
L and Q
†
Lc on the first 2m qubits. An
illustration of this circuit (acting on the |00...0〉 input) is given in Figure 3.
|0〉
QL Q
†
L
|0〉
· · · · · ·
|0〉 •
|0〉
QLc Q
†
Lc
|0〉
· · · · · ·
|0〉 X • X
|0〉
Figure 3: Quantum circuit for SimQuery acting on the |00...0〉 input.
The CCNOT operation flips its target qubit if the control qubits are in the state |11〉. The effect
of the first Pauli X is to flip the outcome when the control qubits are in the state |10〉. Roughly
speaking, SimQuery will flip the final qubit if QL accepts and QLc rejects. The reason for then
applying the two circuits in reverse is to ‘uncompute’ their result and only leave the 2t + 1 qubit
flipped whenever QL accepts and QLc rejects.
We can now explain how NQA can use SimQuery to simulate a query of QA. Suppose QA
queries the oracle for some input x testing to see if it is in L, for some L ∈ QCMA ∩ coQCMA.
In other words, |x〉 |0〉 → |x〉 |1〉, with high probability, if x ∈ L and |x〉 |0〉 → |x〉 |0〉, with high
probability, if x 6∈ L. NQA will then run SimQuery with input |x〉 |w1〉 |0m〉 |x〉 |w2〉 |0m〉 |0〉, where
w1 and w2 are the witnesses from before and m = poly(|x|). The effect of this will be to flip the
final qubit if x ∈ L and leave it unchanged if x 6∈ L, with high probability. This is true because
of the complementarity of QL and QLc (when one accepts the other rejects and viceversa, except
with small probability).
This procedure will simulate the query that QA performs. NQA then uses the last qubit from
SimQuery as the query response qubit and continues to do this for all other queries of QA and
otherwise simulate QA exactly. Note that each simulated query has some small probability of
not matching the actual query of QA when a measurement is performed. However, as mentioned,
this probability is exponentially small. Since there are polynomially many queries in total, by a
union bound, the probability that at least one simulated query behaves incorrectly will still be
exponentially small.
Adding quantum advice to this picture does not change much. Just like in the classical case,
we can assume that NQA receives as advice a concatenation of all advice states used by the oracle
of QA. The quantum circuits QL, QLc and SimQuery are then extended with polynomially many
qubits to act on this advice as well.
It is therefore the case that BQPQCMA/qpoly∩coQCMA/qpoly ⊆ QCMA/qpoly ∩ coQCMA/qpoly and
our result follows directly.
Note that in the QGES, the client need not be a fully BQP-capable machine (and indeed, for
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UBQC the only quantum capabilities of the client are to prepare single qubits).
What happens if we drop the “offline” requirement for this scheme? As mentioned, that would
imply that the mapping from one purification of the encrypted quantum state to another can in
principle be any unitary operation so long as the client can check that the correct mapping was
performed (with high probability). Having such a weak restriction on this unitary makes it very
difficult to impose an upper bound on the types of computations that are allowed by such a scheme.
Indeed, the offline-ness condition plays a crucial role in our proof of Theorem 3. At the same time,
it is arguably a very natural condition to have in any realistic protocol. We therefore leave the
online case as an open problem.
5.2 QGES and NP-hard functions
Theorem 3 can be viewed as a quantum version of Theorem 7 which, as mentioned, was used
by Abadi et al. to show that there can be no GES for NP-hard functions unless the polynomial
hierarchy collapses. As we have stated before, for quantum computers, the possibility of delegating
NP-complete problems makes, arguably, even more sense since Grover’s algorithm offers a quadratic
speed-up in solving such problems [41]. Alas, we show that even with a QGES, delegating such
problems seems unlikely.
Since we have shown that functions which admit an offline QGES are contained in
QCMA/qpoly ∩ coQCMA/qpoly, and since if NP ⊂ QCMA/qpoly ∩ coQCMA/qpoly then coNP ⊂
QCMA/qpoly∩coQCMA/qpoly, to prove Theorem 4, it suffices to show that if coNP ⊂ QCMA/qpoly
then, informally speaking, the polynomial hierarchy “comes about as close to collapsing as
one could reasonably hope to prove given a quantum hypothesis”—and more specifically, that
ΠP3 ⊆
(
ΣP2
)PromiseQMA
. Here a PromiseQMA oracle means an oracle for some PromiseQMA-complete
promise problem (ΠYES,ΠNO), whose responses can be arbitrary on inputs x /∈ ΠYES ∪ ΠNO that
violate the promise. We don’t even demand that the oracle’s responses, on promise-violating
inputs, be consistent from one query to the next. On the other hand, it does need to be possible
to query the PromiseQMA oracle on some promise-violating inputs, without such queries causing
the entire algorithm to abort.
The starting point for all such collapse results, of course, is the Karp-Lipton Theorem [66],
which says that if NP ⊂ P/poly then ΠP2 ⊆ ΣP2 , and hence the polynomial hierarchy collapses to
the second level. An easy extension of the Karp-Lipton theorem, proved by Yap [30], which we
now reprove for completeness, shows that if coNP ⊂ NP/poly, then PH collapses to the third level.
Proposition 1. If coNP ⊂ NP/poly, then ΠP3 ⊆ ΣP3 .
Proof. Abusing notation, here and later in this section we’ll use Φ, Ψ, etc. to refer not only to
SAT19 instances but to strings encoding those instances. Also, if (say) Φ (x, y, z) is a SAT instance
taking multiple strings as input, then by Φ (x, y), we’ll mean the instance obtained from Φ by fixing
the variables in x and y, and leaving only the variables in z as free variables.
A ΠP3 sentence has the form
S = “∀x∃y∀z Φ (x, y, z) ”
where x, y, z are strings of some given polynomial size, and Φ is a polynomial-time computable
predicate (without loss of generality, a SAT instance). Under the stated hypothesis, we need to
show how to decide S in ΣP3 .
Let C be the assumed NP/poly algorithm for coNP, and let a be its advice. Then by hypothesis,
for all SAT instances Ψ, if Ψ is unsatisfiable then there exists a witness w such that C (Ψ, w, a)
accepts, while if Ψ is satisfiable then C (Ψ, w, a) rejects for all w.
Our ΣP3 rewriting of S is now as follows:
There exists an advice string a, such that
19SAT stands for boolean satisfiability and a SAT instance, in our context, simply refers to a boolean formula. The
problem of deciding whether a given boolean formula admits and assignment of variables that evaluates to true (i.e.
a satisfying assignment) is NP-complete.
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(1) (Completeness of C) For all SAT instances Ψ, either there exists a z that satisfies Ψ, or
else there exists a w such that C (Ψ, w, a) accepts.
(2) (Soundness of C) For all SAT instances Ψ, all satisfying assignments z for Ψ, and all w,
the procedure C (Ψ, w, a) rejects.
(3) (Truth of S) For all x, there exists a y as well as a witness w such that C (qΦ (x, y) , w, a)
accepts. (In other words, there is no z that makes Φ (x, y, z) false.)
Proposition 1 is what we seek to imitate in the quantum setting, getting whatever leverage we
can from the weaker assumption coNP ⊂ QCMA/qpoly.
Note that, had we assumed (say) coNP ⊂ QCMA/poly, it would be routine to mimic the usual
Karp-Lipton argument, merely substituting the class PromiseQCMA for NP at appropriate points
in the proof of Proposition 1. This would give us the collapse ΠP3 ⊆
(
ΣP2
)PromiseQCMA
. However,
the fundamental difficulty we face is that our hypothesised nonuniform algorithm uses quantum
advice states. And while a PromiseQMA machine can simply guess a quantum advice state σ, it
can’t then pass σ to an oracle, at least not with conventional oracle calls. (To allow the passing
of quantum states to oracles, we would need quantum oracles, as studied for example by Aaronson
and Kuperberg [65].)
To get around this difficulty, we’ll rely essentially on a 2010 result of Aaronson and Drucker
[67, 68], characterising the power of quantum advice. These authors proved that BQP/qpoly is
contained in QMA/poly—and even more strongly,
Theorem 10. BQP/qpoly = YQP/poly.
Here YQP, known as Yoda quantum polynomial-time, is the class of problems solvable by a
polynomial-time quantum algorithm with help from a polynomial-size untrusted quantum advice
state that depends only on the input length n. In other words, Theorem 10 says that we can
simulate trusted quantum advice by trusted classical advice combined with untrusted quantum
advice, by using the classical advice to verify the quantum advice for ourselves.
By using Theorem 10, to replace a quantification over quantum advice states by a quantification
over classical advice strings, Aaronson and Drucker were able to show the following:
Theorem 11. If NP ⊂ BQP/qpoly, ΠP2 ⊆ QMAPromiseQMA.
By adapting our argument from later in this section, one can actually improve Theorem 11,
to show that if NP ⊂ BQP/qpoly then ΠP2 ⊆ NPPromiseQMA. In any case, we now seek a common
generalisation of the proofs of Proposition 1 and Theorem 11, to get a collapse from the assumption
coNP ⊂ QCMA/qpoly.
As Aaronson and Drucker [68] pointed out, a simple extension of their proof of Theorem 10
gives QCMA/qpoly ⊆ QMA/poly, and even the following.
Theorem 12. QCMA/qpoly = YQ · QCMA/poly.
Here the YQ· operator simply adds untrusted quantum advice to whatever (quantum) com-
plexity class it acts on. Thus YQ · BQP = YQP, while for completeness:
Definition 6. YQ · QCMA is the class of languages L for which there exist polynomial-time quan-
tum algorithms C and V , such that for all input lengths n:
• There exists a polynomial-size quantum advice state σn such that V (0n, σn) accepts with
probability at least 0.99. If V (0n, σ) accepts with probability at least 0.98, then we call the
advice state σ “valid” for input length n.
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• For all inputs x ∈ {0, 1}n ∩L and all valid σ, there exists a polynomial-size classical witness
w such that C (x,w, σ) accepts with probability at least 2/3 .
• For all inputs x ∈ {0, 1}n\L, all classical witnesses w, and all valid σ, we have that C (x,w, σ)
accepts with probability at most 1/3.
In what follows, we’ll need one additional observation about the proof of Theorem 12. Namely,
in our YQ · QCMA/poly simulation of QCMA/qpoly, without loss of generality we can choose the
classical advice string a = an in such a way that there’s essentially just one valid quantum advice
state compatible with a. Or more precisely: we can ensure that, for all ρ1, ρ2 such that V (0
n, a, ρ1)
and V (0n, a, ρ2) both accept with probability at least 0.98, and all x and w, we have (say)
|Pr [C (x,w, a, ρ1) accepts]− Pr [C (x,w, a, ρ2) accepts]| < 1
20
.
This is because Theorem 12, like Theorem 10, is proven via the method of “majority-certificates,”
in which given a polynomial-time quantum algorithm Q, one verifies that an unknown quantum
state ρ leads to approximately the desired values of Pr [Q (x, ρ) accepts] for each of exponentially
many different inputs x, via a measurement of ρ that takes only polynomial time. We note that
this works only because of special structure in ρ—but for any state σ, there exists another state ρ
that has the requisite special structure, as well as a modified quantum algorithm Q′, such that
Pr
[
Q′ (x, ρ) accepts
] ≈ Pr [Q (x, σ) accepts]
for all x.
We’re finally ready to prove Theorem 4.
Proof of Theorem 4. Essentially, we are going to show that if coNP ⊂ QCMA/qpoly, then ΠP3 ⊆(
ΣP2
)PromiseQMA
. A ΠP3 sentence has the form
S = “∀x∃y∀z Φ (x, y, z) ”
where x, y, z are strings of some given polynomial size, and Φ is a polynomial-time computable
predicate. Under the stated hypothesis, we need to show how to decide S in NPNP
PromiseQMA
.
By Theorem 12, the hypothesis coNP ⊂ QCMA/qpoly is equivalent to coNP ⊂ YQ · QCMA/poly.
In other words: we can assume that there exists a polynomial-time quantum algorithm
C (Φ, w, a, σ), which takes as input a SAT instance Φ, a classical witness w, a classical advice
string a, and a quantum advice state σ. Assuming a and σ are the correct YQ · QCMA/poly
advice, C checks whether w is a witness to Φ’s unsatisfiability. This is a sound and complete
proof system for coNP, in the sense that, again assuming the correctness of a and σ,
(i) for every unsatisfiable Φ, there exists a w such that C (Φ, w, a, σ) accepts with probability at
least 2/3,
(ii) for no satisfiable Φ does there exist a w such that C (Φ, w, a, σ) accepts with probability more
than 1/3.
Moreover, as discussed above, there exists an a such that the state σ is essentially unique, in
the sense that
Pr [C (Ψ, w, a, ρ1) accepts] ≈ Pr [C (Ψ, w, a, ρ2) accepts]
for all valid ρ1, ρ2.
Our job is to rewrite S as an NPNP
PromiseQMA
sentence. Our rewriting will be as follows:
There exists a classical advice string a such that
36
(1) for all valid quantum advice states ρ1, ρ2, all SAT instances Ψ, and all assignments w, we
have
|Pr [C (Ψ, w, a, ρ1) accepts]− Pr [C (Ψ, w, a, ρ2) accepts]| < 1
10
.
(In words: the classical advice string a uniquely determines the behaviour of C, once we find
a valid quantum advice state σ that’s compatible with a.)
(2) For all SAT instances Ψ, there exists a valid quantum advice state σ, as well as either an
assignment z that satisfies Ψ, or else a classical witness w such that C (Ψ, w, a, σ) accepts
with probability at least 2/3.
(In words: the advice a leads to a complete procedure for deciding the class coNP, and
specifically the UNSAT problem, in YQ · QCMA/poly. That is, once we find a valid advice
state σ, the quantum algorithm C then accepts every SAT instance Ψ that has no satisfying
assignment.)
(3) For all valid quantum advice states σ, all SAT instances Ψ, all z, and all w, if z satisfies Ψ
then C (Ψ, w, a, σ) rejects with probability at least 2/3.
(In words: a leads to a sound procedure for deciding UNSAT. That is, once we find a valid
σ that’s compatible with a, the quantum algorithm C accepts no SAT instance Ψ that has a
satisfying assignment.)
(4) For all x, there exists a valid quantum advice state σ, as well as a y and a classical witness
w, such that C (qΦ (x, y) , w, a, σ) accepts with probability at least 2/3.
(In words: C verifies that for all x, there exists a y such that qΦ (x, y) is unsatisfiable. In
other words, C verifies that for all x, there exists a y such that for all z, we have Φ (x, y, z).
In other words, C verifies the truth of the ΠP3 -sentence S.)
As a point of clarification, whenever we quantify over quantum states (such as σ), we can
actually take a tensor product of a polynomial number of copies of the states, as needed. Of
course, we can’t rule out the possibility that we’ll get a state that’s entangled across all the
registers. Fortunately, though, we don’t use the witness state registers in such a way that it ever
matters whether they’re entangled or not.
As a second point of clarification, in forming the statement above, whenever we have a condition
that involves a quantum algorithm (say, V or C) accepting with probability at least 2/3, it’s implied
that if the condition fails, then the algorithm accepts with probability at most 1/3. This makes
verifying the condition a quantum polynomial-time operation. Likewise, for part (1), it can be
guaranteed that there exists an a such that, for all ρ1, ρ2 consistent with a and all Ψ and w, the
difference between the two acceptance probabilities is at most (say) 1/20. In such a case, one can
verify in quantum polynomial time that the difference is at most 1/10.
With these clarifications, it’s not hard to see that we’ve given an NPNP
PromiseQMA
procedure. The
NP at the bottom guesses the classical advice string a. The NP in the middle guesses Ψ for part (2)
and x for part (4), and is not needed for parts (1) and (3). Finally, the PromiseQMA on top guesses
the quantum advice state σ (or ρ1, ρ2 for part (1)), as well as Ψ, w, y, and z as needed. Crucially,
quantum states are only ever guessed in the topmost, PromiseQMA quantifier: once guessed, they
never need to be passed on to another quantifier, which is impossible with conventional oracle calls.
But why does the procedure we’ve given correctly decide the ΠP3 -sentence S? Well, firstly, if
a is a correct trusted advice string, then part (4) of the procedure just directly expresses S, using
the assumed YQ · QCMA/poly algorithm for coNP to eliminate one of the three quantifiers in the
usual manner of Karp-Lipton theorems.
That leaves the problem of verifying that a is a correct trusted advice string. Parts (2) and
(3) of the procedure verify the latter, by quantifying over all possible SAT instances Ψ of the
appropriate polynomial size, and checking that for each one, either Ψ has a satisfying assignment
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or else there’s a witness w that causes C to accept Φ, but not both. (In other words, C decides
coNP in YQ · QCMA/poly.)
Now, for parts (2) and (4), we additionally needed an existential quantifier over the untrusted
quantum advice state σ, which is then verified using the trusted classical advice string a. The
reason is that, in parts (2) and (4), the third and final quantifier needed, over the classical strings
y, z, or w, happens to be existential—so that third quantifier simply must do “double duty” by
also guessing the state σ. As mentioned before, passing a quantum state from an earlier quantifier
to a later one is impossible with conventional oracle calls.
However, this need to quantify existentially over σ opens up a problem. Namely, what if the
existential quantifiers, in parts (2) or (4), can be satisfied by different advice states σ—states that
are all compatible with a, but that lead to different behaviours of C on some inputs? For example,
perhaps there exists an a such that some σ’s compatible with a give rise to a complete verification
procedure for UNSAT, while other σ’s compatible with a give rise to a sound verification procedure
for UNSAT, but the same σ never gives rise to both. If so, then the σ that we find in part (4)
need not give rise to a correct YQ · QCMA/poly algorithm for coNP.
Fortunately, we can fix this problem using part (1). In part (1), we enforced that every state σ
compatible with a must give rise to essentially the same behaviour on every input. Thus, from that
point forward, it doesn’t even matter whether we find σ via a universal quantifier or an existential
one: every σ that passes verification will give rise to the same behaviour, and parts (2), (3), and
(4) are all talking about the same YQ · QCMA/poly procedure that correctly decides coNP.
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